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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
~]/\t![ M. ,ll>RGENSEN and 
1.Rnr M ,]{lf<(;r~NSEN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
SM.T [,AKE CI TY CORPORATION, 
a boiiy corporate and politic 
under the 1 aws of the State 
of Utah, and THE ROARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 19261 
I. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a final District Court judgment 
affirming a Salt Lake City Board of Adjustment's, decision 
denying appellant-Jorgensens' request for a conditional use to 
operate a day-care business from their home located in a 
Residential "R-2" zone. 
II. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On April 19, 1982, the City's Board of Adjustment duly 
denied Mrs. Jorgensen's request for a conditional use permit to 
operate a registered family day care business in her home. 
Appelldnts, Mr. & Mrs. Jorgensen, timely filed a "Complaint and 
Pc·t1tion for Relief" in the Third Judicial District Court in 
compliance with Section 10-9-15 Utah Code Ann., 1953. Jorqensen> 
prayed for and obtained a preliminary injunction to continue 
their business pending an expedited trial. 
The Board filed a Motion to determine the scope of judicial 
review of the matter. After argument, the lower court ruled that 
its review of a Board of Adjustment decision was an exercise of 
the court's traditional appellate jurisdiction. It would not 
conduct an evidentiary trial ~ novo; rather, it held that 
judicial review was limited to the issues ano evidence before the 
Board. The legal standard for said review was whether the 
Board's decision was arbitrary, illeqal or a capricious abuse of 
the Board's power. Other aspects of the Motion were not ruled 
upon. (R83-94). 
Within those parameters, the court received evidence and 
testimony regarding the matters before the Board. The lower 
court ruled the record supported the Board's decision and that it 
was not unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or capricious. (R 
118). As such, it affirmed and upheld the Board of Adjustment's 
order and decision. (R 119). A copy of the Judgment is atta~~ 
as Appendix Exhibit A or "App. A". 
III. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents Salt Lake City and its Board of Adjustment seek 
the ruling of the District court to be affirmed. 
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IV. 
STATFMENT OF FACTS 
1'ii0 lr'cS than complete description of the facts by the 
'-"'" in their Brief and mischaracterizatons of facts they 
" 10 ,_iLe, inaccurately represents and distorts the actual 
Tncluded below is a synopsis of the relevant facts: 1 
A. _L_egislative framework. (App. B, paragraphs 1-9). 
1. State law 2 regulates and licenses child care businesses, 
when that care is provided for more than 2 children for more than 
4 hours in any one day. The Division of Family Services ("DFS") 
administers the regulations and issues the state licenses. Their 
rules note that licensees must also comply with applicable local 
ordinances, such as zoning requirements. (R 16, 18, 73). 
2. Before 1981, Salt Lake City had passed ordinances 
c,)ncern i ng child day-care businesses for general heal th, 
sanitation and safety conditions. The ordinances reguired a 
Regulatory Permit from the City-County Health Department after a 
premises inspect ion. (R 16, 31). 
3. Under City zoning laws, such businesses were permitted 
as a "conditional use" in the mixed use "R-6" residential 
districts. Day-care businesses, along with other businesses, 
1
For d rrore explicit recitation 
,,,HJ s:ipporting citations to the 
(•T llApp. B." 
lion 55-9-1, et seq. U.C .A. 
Fxh1bit "c 11 • 
of the facts and statutory law 
record see Appendix Exhibit "B" 
A copy is attached as Appendix 
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were precluded in the more restricted "R-1" throuqh "R-5" 
residential zones. (R 74, 75). 
4. Restricted home occupations do not contemplate or pennj ,_ 
group activity. The City's Board of Adjustment had previously 
heard two cases from preschools/day care businesses, which also 
unsuccessfully sought Board interpretations in order to oain a 
liberalization of the zoninq scheme. All such requests had 
consistently and uniformly been denied but the Board had 
requested consideration of comprehensive policy revision. 
19' 75). 
B. Origination of the Initial Controversy. 
paragraphs 10-24). 
(App. B, 
5. Appellant-Jorgensens' occupied the tope of a home 
( R 18, 
converted into a duplex, which was located in a duly adopted "R-
2" zone. 
6. Mrs. Jorgensen's business involved providing regular 
day-care in 1980 for 10 different children in her home, which 
averaged from 3 to 6 children present on various days. 
7. The City's Zoning Department investigated a complaint 
registered by neighbors, and ruled the day-care business violated 
the "R-2" zoning. 
8. Mrs. Jo rq e nsen appealed the ru 1 i ng to the Board, 
contesting it was not a childrens day-care center business, but a 
home occupation use. Mrs. Jorgensen appeared with counsel at il 
public hearing before the Board on this issue known as Case 
-4-
, ; _ Tuc'l ve other residents in the area, bearing a petition 
,,j I>! 27 area residents, urged the Board not to adopt the 
,,i int Pr-pretaton, which would substantially liberalize then 
,;;: 1 <..,tJnSJ zoning policy. 
9. Appellant-Jorgensen presented testimony to the Board and 
r•cponded to her neighbors' opposition. 
10. In its deliberations, the Board requested a legal 
npinion and deferred action to its next meeting, at which time 
the Roard determined the business did not qualify as a home 
0ccupat ion use in a "R-2" zone. The Board noted that there were 
~·"ndinq proposals for ordinance revisions, but that changes 
sought by Appellant-Jorgensens must be made through the City's 
legislative body. 
C. First Lawsuit and Ordinance Revision. (App. B, 
pAragraphs 25-33). 
11. Jorgensens appealed the Board's decision in Case 8457 
to the Third District Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief. 
12. In order to obtain a preliminary injunction in the 
aforesaid suit and thereby permit the continuation of business 
pennina trial, appellant-Jorgensen was required to comply with 
'hp terms of the proposed ordinance and obtain DFS licensing. 
~!1is State requirement forced a reduction of the number of 
h ilrlren to a maximum of 6, which number was to include her own 
~ 1 <:'schoolPrs. 
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13. In November 1981 the new ordinance was modi f ierl and 
adopted by the City's seven memher elected City Council. It 
required each request for a conditional use to operate a 
"Registered Home Day Care" in homes for groups of 3-6 children tc, 
go before the City's Board of Adjustment in a noticed puhlic 
hearing unless the owners of property within an 85' parameter 
(the "Neighborhood") indicated in writing their consent or lack 
of objection to approval of the conditional use permit. Bill 78 
of 1981, effective November 1, 1981 is attached in appendix 
Exhibit "D". 
14. The parties stipulated to dismissal of the aforesaid 
First Lawsuit, with prejudice, so appellant-Mrs. Jorgensen could 
apply under the new legislation. 
D. Case No. 8891 - The Second Board Case. (App. B 
paragraphs 33-47). 
15. On March 5, 1982 appellant-Mrs. Jorgensen applied to the 
Board for a conditional use to operate a "registered home day 
care" facility in her home. In this application ("Case 8891") 
the request was to care for up to 5 children at one time. 
16. The required public hearing was scheduled for March 22, 
1982 and notices duly mailed. As the item was called, a clerical 
error in the aqenda classification was noted, in that the use was 
identified as a "preschool", rather than a "day-care" 
application. This matter was noted and corrected. No one clairnc 
prejudice by this correction. 
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, 7. f\ppPl lant-Mrs. Jorgensen appeared again with counsel to 
li•cr pirosentation. She was permitted to fully present her 
""·l11clinq the status of the First Case, the First Lawsuit 
and ell the facts of her desired use in context of the new City 
.:cdinanc1•s. At this lengthy hearing, owners of three separate 
~rapctties within the Neighborhood appeared and testified in 
' .. ppusition to the request and submitted written opposition from 
,~,iners of two more parcels. One mother employing Mrs. Jorgensen 
aµpeared in her support. Appellant-Jorgensens had the 
opportunity with counsel to confront and respond to the 
opposition. 
18. Although a legal quorum was present, two Board members 
were absent. Therefore, after discussion, the Board voted to 
continue deliberations over for two weeks to its next meeting in 
order to have the benefit of the full membership on what it knew 
was a controversial decision. Deliberations were recommenced on 
April 5, 1982. After due consideration of all evidence, the new 
City ordinance and legal arguments, the Board voted 5/0 to deny 
the conditional use request, because it failed to satisfy all of 
the legislative criteria. 
E. Second Lawsuit and Trial. 
19. The District Court reviewed all of the evidence before 
Lhe Boatd of Adjustment and ruled it acted lawfully and not 
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arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably. 3 
v. 
ISSUES 
1. When considering requests for relief from municipal 
Boards of Adjustment: 
(a) What is the ~istrict Court's jurisdiction and 
scope of review? 
(b) Is there a rebutable presumption of validity of an 
administrative Board's decision? 
(c) Is the burden of proof on the challenger to 
establish the administrative Board erred? 
2. Did the lower court err in applying the traditional 
standards of appellate review in this case. 
3. Did the lower court err in receiving all information 
before the Board in order to make a full or plenary judicial 
scrutiny. 
4. Did the lower court err in determining that: (a) the 
allegations of procedural or substantive irregularities were 
either not substantiated or of no prejudicial effect; and (b) the 
Board's decision was a valid and reasonable act, supported .by the 
evidence. 
3contrary to Appellant's assertion, the Court did not qrant a 
stay of its decision, absent the proper filing of a supersedeas 






Tilt: flISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE 
B'IARD OF ADJUS™ENT'S DECISION DENYING THE 
Pr:OUEST FOR A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. 
A. THE LOWER COURT APPLIED THE APPELLATE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN SCRUTINIZING A BOARD OF 
ADJIJS'™ENT DECISION. 
District courts are given two types of jurisdiction under 
section 7, Article VIII of the Utah State Constitution; these are 
generally characterized as original and appellate. Said section 
, 1,ecifically grants the district courts appellate jurisdiction 
arid supervisorv control over all inferior courts and tribunals. 
Specifically, with regard to the matter before this Court, 
Utah statutory law provides: 
"Judicial review of a board's decision--time 
1 imitation. The city or any person agrees by any 
decision of the Board of Adjustment may have and 
maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in 
any court of competent jurisdiction; provided, 
petition for such relief is presented to a court 
of competent jurisdiction within 30 days after the 
filing of such decision in the office of the 
Board." Section 10-9-15 Utah Code Annotated, 
19 53. 
This statute had three purposes: 4 (l} To reauire the 
petition for judicial appellate review to be filed within 30 
thout the existence of Section 10-9-15 U.C.A., judicial review 
'.'' a City Board of Adjustment as in counties, would proceed via 
" 11 le Vi(B), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which did not provide 
'.h•c,cc functions prior to passage of Rules Bl(d} and 73. 
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days; (2) To fix an ascertainable event to triooer the 
commencements of the limitation period, in this case thP ,11rc,, 
filino of the decision in the Board's office; and (3) To c1ari 1,, 
that the reviewing court is not confined solely to the certified 
findings, but a full and plenary action requires consideration of 
all evidence and information presented and considered by the 
Board. 
This universally accepted principle is summarized by 
McQuillin as follows: 
"In other words, the scope of judicial review and 
inquiry is limited to whether the detPrmination of 
the zoning board is unreasonable, arbitrary or an 
abuse of discretion on the facts or is an illegal 
error. And the reviewing court is reouired to 
consider the evidence most favorable to the 
decision of the zoning authorities." BA 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §25.334 at p. 
472 (Emphasis added). 
This Supreme Court has not, at this writing, expressly ruled 
on the standard of review to be applied by the District Court i11 
reviewing a decision arising from a municipal Board of Adjustment 
under Section 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. 5 However, it has ruled on 
the nearly identical one regarding the appropriate standard of 
review of local county zoning board administrative decisions. 
Cottonwood Heiohts Citizen Association v. Board of Commissioners 
of Salt Lake County, 593 P.2d 138 (Utah, 1979). 
5case No. 18333, Gary J. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Sa!!_ 
Lake City, briefed in 1982 and was aroued on November 17, 1983 
presents the identical issue now presented in this case. 
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This case was brought by a citizen group contesting the 
,, 1 s1 rative act of the County in issuing a special conditional 
c· ,mit to al low construction of a larqe apartment complex, 
efi~r mnd1fication of a plan which had earlier been rejected. 
o<cfo 1 c arldressing specific factual issues at play, this Court 
1~ 1 d Lhe rules for judicial review of zoning decisions; it 
stated: 
"In addressing the plaintiff's attack upon the 
juclgn1ent, there are certain rules to be-
considered. Due to the complexity of factors 
involved in the matter of zoning, as in other 
fields where the court reviews the actions of 
administrative bodies, it should be assumed that 
those charged with that responsibility (the 
com-mission) have specialized knowledge in that 
field. Accordingly they should be allowed a 
comparatively wide latitude of discretion and 
their action endowed with the presumption of 
correctness and validity which the court should 
not interfere with unless it it shown that there 
is no reasonable basis to justify the action 
taken." Cottonwood Heights Citizen Association v. 
BOard of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, .!2_. at 
p. 140 (Emphasis added). 
In establishing such rules, the court has merely clarified and 
clearly extended to zoning administrative cases the general rules 
of appellate review applied in earlier zonina cases. See Gayland 
v. Salt Lake County, 11 U.2d 307, 358 P.2d 633 (1961) (denial of 
rezoninq to commercial use); Naylor v. Salt Lake City Cory., 17 
'J.2d 300, 410 P.2d 764 (1966) (rezoning from "R-6" to "B-3"); 
·rPsrview-Holladay Home Owners Assn., Inc. v. Engh Floral Cory., 
;4) P.2d 1150 (Utah, 1976) (rezoning from agricultural-
·"'-idential to commercial). 
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The issuance and consideration of whether or not to qrar.L 
conditional use permit by a Board of Adjustment requires 
consideration of the same complicated and inter-related areas of 
zoning and land use policies as it does by a county commission. 
Such factors are not simple ministerial functions, but are 
complex discretionary decisions involving the balancing of 
interests and public policy. Such a Board should be entitled to 
the same respect which the Court has already extended to the 
decisions on condition al uses made by a County Commission, which 
is, in reality, merely exercising parallel administrative 
authority when it reviews such conditional use permits. 
Appellant-Jorgensens argue, without citation of relevant 
authority, that the existence of Section 10-9-15 U.C.A. somehow 
dictates a substantive change of a law regarding appellate 
review. 6 They suggest that the holdings of the Supreme Court in 
applying that traditional appellate standard of review to zoning 
decisions relating to conditional uses made by county 
administrative bodies should not apply to municipal statutory 
bodies performing the identical factors. In effect, appellants 
urge this Court to read the statute to transform a reviewing 
District Court into a super Board of Adjustment, free to 
substitute its judgment and land use philosophy or bias for that 
of the statutory local Board, without determining whether or not 
6see pp. 18-23 Appellant-Jorgensens' Brief. 
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, 1·ri'.s original clecision was illegal or unreasonable and 
,, y ""··iny unsupported by the evidence. 
c,,, h a rx:isition would require this Court to reverse soundly 
,,.snn~d case law and alternatively, Jorgensens' theory would 
reete Lhe undefensible result that a person who desires to 
,·n~.l IPnqe an action by a zoning administrative body, either 
cJpnyinq or aranting conditional use permit, would have entirely 
.iiffnent rcmeclies and standard of judicial review depending 
·~olely whether his property is located in a City, arising under 
section 10-9-15, or in an unincorporated area under County 
crintrol, where there is no similar statute of limitation. 
rroperly, the lower court rejected such theory. 
The lower court's decision to apply an appellate standard of 
review to the administrative zoning decision was consistent with 
the law regarding review of zoning boards. It also makes a 
consistent rule of interpretation for parties contesting the 
zoning actions throughout the State, regardless of whether the 
rrnperty is within or without City limits. This Court should 
affirm that a reviewing district court's duty is to determine if 
the local zoning commission or Board of Adjustment acted 
illegally or in excess of their power or without reasonable 
1 ·'lat 10nship to the evidence and information before them and, 
,~fore, were arbitrary and capricious. 
The lower court in this case applied the appropriate 
· i'PPllate standard of review and did not err. 
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B. THE COURT PROPERLY PROVIDED APPELLANTS A 
"PLENARY ACTION" IN SCRUTINIZING THE BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT'S DECISION. 
The lower court in this case conducted a plenary or full, 
complete, and unqualified scrutinizing of an administrative 
decision, as required by Section 10-9-15 U.C.A. It did conduct a 
full or plenary scrutiny, under its appellate jurisdiction, of 
the record made, evidence presented to, and information known a~ 
used by the Board in its deliberations. 
The Jorgensens did not object to the Court's declining to 
conduct an evidentiary trial ~ novo to their "plenary action." 
However, Jorgensens' primary legal theory is that the Court err~ 
only in its failure to: (a) Ignore the Board's decision and 
evaluate the merits de novo based upon the court's understanding 
of the City's legislative policy, and (b) redetermine and reweigh 
the facts in light of its own philosophy and experience, as a 
matter of original jurisdiction. 7 
Appellant-Jorgensens' theory is not supported by a careful 
reading of the case cited in their Brief. 8 Furthermore, the only 
Utah case which both parties could locate interpreting the word 
"plenary" arose from a 1940 case: Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public 
Service Commission, 98 u. 431, 100 P.2d 552 (1940). This case 
7see, pp. 18 of Appellant-Jorgensens' Brief. 
8Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 134 P.2d 976, (Okla. 1942) 
involves a case decidinq whether congressional "plenary" powers 
retained over Indians and their tribal property preempted State 
law on intestamentary inheritance. 
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iiN· l·'r·<l the challenge of a Public Service Commission ("PSC") 
i,, 0 n. Here the Utah statute authorized any person aggrieved 
!_>xinq an action . •. for a plenary review .•. which shall 
Ecweccl as a trial de novo". In addressing what is reauired by 
tliat statute, this Court held that judicial "plenary review" 
required a "full review, a complete review"; it also held that 
the phrase "trial ~ novo" did not change the appellate nature of 
the review, but it only insured that a complete review would be 
conducted by the lower court. ~· at p. 555. 
Significantly, the Court explained that in judicial scrutiny 
of an administrative act, even the statute's express language of 
"trial ~ novo" did not change the standard of appellate 
review. This Court held that such language did not contemplate a 
complete retrial upon new evidence or reweighing of those 
facts. Such a review, it was held, would be inconsistent with 
the function of judicial supervision. Thus, the statutory 
language was interpreted to be a trial upon the record made 
before the administrative body. In so ruling, the Court 
interpreted "plenary" and observed: 
"What the legislature has done by section 9 is to 
increase the scope of the court's review of the 
record of the commission's actions to include 
questions of fact as well as questions of law. A 
submission to the court of the application, 
together with testimony other than the record 
before the court was not contemplated." (Emphasis 
added). ~· at p. 555. 
In 1955, a second D&RG case further expounded on the proper 
scope of judicial review of administrative bodies, Denver & Rio 
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Grande Western Railroad Company v. Central Weber Sewer 
Improvement District, 4 U.2d 105, 287 P.2d 884 (1955). Th is l''1--
arose under a statute which provided a remedy for property owner• 
protesting improvement district tax assessments; it required the 
taxpayer to apply for a writ of review of the actions of the 
board. Similar to Section 10-9-15 U.C.A now under Court revi~, 
this law made no grant of trial de novo. 
Plaintiffs, as taxed property owners, urged they were 
entitled to a district court trial~ novo in all respects. The 
sewer district urged that by writ only the certified evidence and 
the official record of the administrative body were reviewable. 
The court held a review of the full record must be made to 
determine if due process had been satisfied. If the written 
record reveals that the administrative body complied with this 
process and the facts of record either support or negate the 
decision, then the scrutinizing court need only examine the 
record before the body to determine if an abuse of discretion 
occurred. However, if the written record was inadequate to make 
that type of a determination, the lower court was entitled allow 
the record to be supplemented to determin~ what all the facts 
were before the administrative tribunal. Thereafter, the Court 
could review the factual considerations of the Board in the 
process of making its analysis. 
In a recent 1976 Utah case of Peatross v. Board of 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah, 1976) the 
-16-
,,,,J,linu ,,f lhe 1955 D&RG v. Central Weber case was affirmed. The 
arose out of the County Commission's administrative 
,), 0 t ion of plaintiff's massage/health studio license. 
p1aintiff appealed to the district court via extraordinary writ 
iinder Rule 65(B), U.R.C.P. claiming the right to a trial~ 
novo. The lower court refused and, like the case at bar, the 
lower court ruled it would only review the record before the 
administrative board to determine if it acted illegally, 
capriciously or arbitrarily. 
Upon an interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
lower court ruling, acknowledging the lower court's 
constitutional responsibility to provide appellate review to 
supervise the inferior courts and tribunals. 9 It also held that 
actions arising under Rule 65(B) for judicial review were to be 
cons iuered by the lower court: (1) under its traditional 
appellate jurisdiction, and (2) without entitling the court to 
conduct an evidentiary trial ~ novo. This Court reaffirmed, 
holding: 
"The standard rule is that appellate jurisdiction 
is the authority to review the actions or 
judgments of an inferior tribunal upon the record 
made in a tribunal, and to affirm, modify, or 
reverse such action of judgment." Id. at p. 284 
(Emphasis added). 
Th~ court further stated: 
. Where the defendant board has conducted a 
~Section 7, Article VIII of the Utah State Constitution. 
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hearing that comported with due process 
requirements, and there is no express statutory 
grant of a trial de nova, the plaintiff is 
mistaken on her insistence that she is entitled to 
one as a matter of riqht. However we deem it 
appropriate to observe that notwithstanding what 
we have said herein, the petition for and the 
issuance of an extraordinary writ upon Rule 65{b) 
is in the nature of a proceeding in equity; and we 
do not desire to be understood as foreclosing the 
proposition that the district court in the 
exercise of its general powers as hereinabove 
pointed, could take evidence if it reouired that 
the interest of justice so required." Id. at p. 
284 {Emphasis added). 
The law is consistent with a proper respect for the 
separation of powers. "Plenary action" for relief from a zonina 
adminstrative decision is a review to assure that minimum due 
process of law is observed and to review the evidence presented 
to these specialized administrative boards to assure that they do 
not act illegally, arbitrarily or capriciously. The lower court 
properly performed its function and appellants' urging to have 
District Courts sit as super boards of adjustments should be 
rejected. 
C. THE La-IER COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED ALL 
EVIDENCE OF INFORMATION AND CONSIDERATIONS 
BEFORE THE BOARD. 
It is ironic that Jorgensens' argue that the type of hearing 
mandated before the lower court is to be a full scrutiny of the 
evidence and information before the Board, yet they claim 
prejudicial error by the lower court receiving the record of the 
Board's First Case No. 8457, over objection. Admittinq that 
evidence was not error; it was completely admissible under the 
-18-
·::lc·s of evidPnce and was necessary to conduct a "plenary" review 
nclys1s of the Board's decision under Section 10-9-15 u.C.A. 
rel ('vancv. In response to the ohjection on the ground 
f , ·:·J ,,,;,,cl('y, the court specifically made a finding that, 
in"'""uch as it was compelled to conduct a full review of the 
r,.-ard decision, it desired all the evidence and information 
.·efure the Board, as it considered the issues. 
The facts are not in dispute that Case 8457 was physically 
in ftont of the Board. Without the benefit of Case 8457, the 
lower court noted, it would be handicapped with less than the 
full record. The necessity and relevance was obvious and 
Jndisputable, although the court acknowledged that the weight or 
materiality of the information contained therein was not being 
determined. 
The Court noted that the technical issues in these two cases 
were different; however, the parties, the property owners and 
neighbors were (in fact) the same. The lower court was fully 
aware of the ordinance change and that the legal issues had 
chanqed. In fact the Findings of the Board's Second Case 8891 
clearly show that the Board knew of the change of policy 
contained in the New Ordinance and that it was the Board's 
responsibility to apply the new criteria to the facts at hand. 
Those relevant facts were facially obvious from the 
·1 1 scc1ssion of the later Case No. 8891. (R 20-23). The lower 
-19-
court saw through the inconsistency of appellant-Joroensen's 
argument. It would have been a distortion to improperly limit 
the Court's factual review and eliminate a portion of the rrcnr,. 
clearly and properly within the Board's and all parties' 
knowledge. Exclusion of this historic backdrop and evidence 
would be inconsistent with the mandate of a meaningful judicial 
plenary review. 
2. Inadmissibility. A review of Case No. 8457 demonstrates 
the hearings and deliberations were conducted in open rneetinq ~ 
the Board after not ice. Appellants we re pr es en t and represented 
by counsel, exercised their opportunity to orally present their 
case to the decisionmakers and to confront opposition and counter 
adverse evidence presented. Minutes reflect that at the heari~ 
the introduction was made by the staff of the issues and 
background. Jorgensens were given an op port unity to be present 
with counsel and provide all of the supporting documentation and 
rationale for their request. Interested parties were given 
opportunity to give public comment and Jorgensens were given and 
exercised the opportunity to respond to those allegations. R 16-
19, App. B, paragraphs 18-24. 
In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 90 S.Ct. 1011 the elements of 
fundamental due process by administrative bodies were 
enumerated. The Court dealt with New York's administrative 
procedure of disqualifying welfare recipients. That procedure 
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, 1 ,1,,1 1,r"virle a hearinq with the elements of due process until 
1,, 11C'fits had been terminated. The court's finding was 
P)'/ t h,1t the due process reauirements offered in the 
,,"01 ;,,1t1un hearing must occur prior, rather than subsequent to 
,,_',"fit t cnni nation. The court did set forth the necessary 
,-,J,-rc,r,nts of due process by administrative bodies; however, 
,,,, 11 trdry to the inference of Jorgensen's brief, it did not 
C''cJuire the formalities of a judicial setting. The essential 
e1,,,,,.nts of due process include: 
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law 
is the opportunity to be heard. (citations 
omitted) The hearing must be 'at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner.' (citations 
nmitted) In the present context these principles 
require that a recipient having timely and 
adequate notice detailing the reasons for a 
proposed determination, and an effective 
opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse 
witnesses and presenting his own arguments and 
evidence orally. ~· at p. 268-69. 
Such rudimentary fundamental elements of due process were 
more than satisfied when the Board provided an opportunity for 
the plaintiff to appear with counsel and be heard at a meaningful 
cime prior to the action and in a meaningful manner. In this 
case the record amply demonstrates that the Jorgensens' rights of 
procedural and substantive due process were not violated and did. 
not taint the proceedings of either case, and Case 8457 was not 
inad111issihle. 
3. Hearsay. Additionally the contents of Case 8457 are 
Ylr111ssihle as an express exception to the heresay rule. 
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Exhibit D-2 is the certifiect copy of an official ctocument 01 
the Salt Lake Board of Adjustment. The Board's secretary 
certified it is a correct copy of the contents of the official 
Board file known as Case No. 8457. The case file constituted an 
official public and business record of the Board that is normally 
retained and the certification came from the party having the 
custodial responsibility therefor. (Certification, Ex. D-2), 
Said record was thus certified and authenticated pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Thus, Exhibit D-2 of case 8457 is expressly admissible as 
exceptions to the heresay objection under Rule 63(16-17). 
The existence of the public records were known to 
Jorgensens, and were placed in controversy by their Complaint. 
(R3-20). Its admission was clearly proper and within the Court's 
power of discretionary evidence receipt. 10 
D. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AFFORDING THE 
BOARD'S DECISION WITH A REBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND IMPOSING THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF ON APPELLANT TO PROVE 
ILLEGALITY OR ARBITRARINESS. 
In the unusually well reasoned decision of Williams v. 
Zoning Adjustment Board of the City of Laramie, 383 P.2d 730 
(Wyo. 1963), the granting of variance by a board of adjustment 
was challenged. In that opinion, Judge Mcintire took the 
opportunity to specifically address issues posed in this case, 
lORule 64, Utah Rules of Evidence; D&RGW v. Public Service 
Commission, supra. 
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,c l11c1 j ng; (a) standard of judicial review, (b) type of 
,rl 0 ntiary hearing required, (c) the presumed validity of an 
,,o:rii 11 1"1rative hoard's decision, and (d) when courts are free to 
sulistitute their own judgment for that of a board. He correctly 
• 11 minarizes the general principles of law as follows: 
"In keeping with the general rule that, in the 
ahsence of evinence to the contrary, public 
officers will be presumed to have properly 
perforl'led their duties and not to have acted 
illegally, decisions of zoning boards of 
adjustment as to exceptions and variations are 
regarded as presumptively fair, reasonable and 
correct; and the burden is Up<?n those complaining 
thereof to show the board acted improperly." 
(citati99s omitted). Id. at 733 (emphasis 
added). 
Those same principles of rebuttable presumptions and burdens 
of proof have also been clearly adopted by this Court. In 
Cottonwood Heights, this Court observed: 
" .•• and their action [administrative condi-
tional use permit], endowed with a presumption of 
validity which the court should not interfere with 
unless it is shown that there is no reasonable 
basis to justify the action taken." 593 P.2d at 
p. 140. (Emphasis added). 
It is for the challenger of an administrative action to bear 
11
see also Ivankovich v. City of Tucson, 22 Ariz.App. 530, 529 
P 2d 242 (1974); Whitcomb v. City of Woodward, 616 P.2d 455 
IGkla.App. 1980); Eason Oil Co. v. Uhls, 518 P.2d 50 (Okla., 
l9/4); Siller v. Board .of Supervisors of City & County of San 
f!._a~~. 25 Cal.Rptr. 73, 375 P.2d 41 (1962). 
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the burden to show the decision is arbitrary and capricious. 12 
The court has indicated that it is not appropriate for the 
judiciary to invade the administrative branch of government. le 
should not attempt to substitute its judgment, absent prior 
finding that clear and convincing error exists or "that there is 
no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it and its action must 
therefore be regarded as capricious and arbitrary." 13 
Similar instructions but in greater specificity have been 
given by the Kansas Supreme Court in the case of Richard v. 
Fundenberger, 1 Kan.App.2d. 222, 563 P.2d 1069 (1977). It 
instructed the lower court: 
"The power of the district court, in reviewing 
zoning determinations, is limited to determinina 
(1) the lawfulness of the action taken, that is, 
whether procedures in conformity with law were 
employed, and (2) the reasonableness of such 
action. In making the second determination, the 
court may not substitute its judgment for that of 
the governing body and should not declare the 
action of the governing body unreasonable unless 
clearly compelled to do so by the evidence. 
(citations omitted). There is a presumption that 
the governing body cited reasonably and it is 
incumbent upon those attacking its action to show 
the unreaonableness thereof by a preponderance of 
the evidence. (Citations omitted)." Id. at p. 
1071. 
12Gayland v. Salt Lake County, supra and 4 R. Anderson, American 
Law of Zoning, §25.26, p. 263 (2nd Edition 1977). 
13Naylor v. Salt Lake Cit~ Corp., supra at p. 766, see also 
Siller v. Board of Supervisors of CltV& County of San Francisco, 
supra at p. 44; Monte Vista Professional Building, Inc. v. City 
of Monte Vista, 531 P.2d 400 (Colo.App. 1975); Whitcomb v. Ci\j'. 
of Woodward, supra at p. 456 and Rickard v. Fundenberger, ~' 
at p. 1072. 
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<nnsr0 q1Jently, it is naive or unrealistic for any challengers 
"'' administrative decision to assume that the plenary action 
,c'i•vPs him/her from the significant burden to rebut the 
2,, 5 umption of validity by clear and convincing evidence of 
,•,ror. Jorgensens properly did not prevail because their facts 
in the record could not meet that test. At best as discussed in 
Point II they demonstrated the issue was one over which 
reasonable parties may disagree, but the Board committed no 
Prrors requiring invalidation on the grounds of illegality. 
E. THE COURT PROPERLY DECLINED TO SUBSTITUTE ITS 
DECISION FOR AND ASSUME THE BOARD'S POWER 
ABSENT A FINDING OF ILLEGALITY OR 
UNREASONABLENESS. 
The real epicenter of this appeal focuses on the lower 
court's ruling that, under appellate standards of review, it 
would not substitute its judgment .over that of the Board. It 
properly understood the judicial rule to uphold the Board's 
decision, absent convincing evidence pursuading him that Board's 
act was illegal, arbitrary or capricious from the record and 
evidence before the Board. 
As most recently repeated in the Cottonwood Heights case, 
~~. this Court requires judicial restraint in such instances 
i,ecause it recognizes that zoning issues are deceptively 
complex. The legislature has specifically charged these issues 
tr.· a" administrative body to handle. These boards, which deal 
Frequently with such issues, develop a specialized experience and 
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expertise in the area that cannot be duplicated in the isolat~ 
cases that come for judicial scrutiny. For this reason and to 
respect the separation of powers principles, the Court has 
clearly held that the judiciary should not interfere "unless it 
is shown there is no reasonable basis to justify the action 
taken." 14 To rule otherwise would deny boards the power to 
perform their statutory responsibilities involving discretionary 
administrative judgments. These boards bring, not only their 
talents and leadership, but their cross section of the knowledge 
of the unique characteristics of the neighborhoods with which 
they are familiar. They know of the impact of zoning on people's 
lives and have to make difficult questions. They know the 
interrelationships of purposes underlying the ordinance 
requirements, the policies, the competing interests, and the 
technical loopholes that cause abuse. They experience the 
tension of opposition and disappointment from denying a desired 
request, just as courts do, and they are equally sensitive to the 
fundamentals of fairness. They are guided by a purpose to 
delicately balance people's requests against the objectives and 
policy of zoning legislation that they only have power to 
implement, not make. 
14cottonwood Heights, supra p. 140. See also Naylor v. Salt L~ 
City Corp., supra at p. 766, see also Siller v. Board of 
Supervisors of City & County of San Francisco, supra at p. 44; 
Monte Vista Professional Building, Inc. v. City of Monte Vista, 
supra at p. 402-3; Whitcomb v. City of Woodward, supra at p. 456 
and Rickard v. Fundenberger, supra, at p. 1072. 
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secondly, judicial deference to these specialized 
,,,n•inistriltive boards preserves the constitutional purposes of 
,cracation of powers by a system of checks and balance. Section 
10-9-15 or Rule 65(B) U.R.C.P. is the judiciary's check on 
aclrrinistrative bodies, but limiting review to the record under a 
standard of illegality or capriciousness respects the executive's 
role in administering the law. It keeps Courts from becoming 
super Boards of Adjustment, where the administrative boards act 
only as a screening body and every unsuccessful applicant oets a 
new~ novo hearing. Such a system would burden the courts and 
effectively makes the Boards only recommendary and advisory 
panels to the judiciary, who would make formal policy 
decisions. The courts lack the Board's broad perspective and are 
more likely to consider the issues in a microcosmic setting; they 
lack exposure and sensitivity to the whole comprehensive zoning 
scheme and should not be placed in that policy implementing role. 
Thirdly, failing to give deference to the Board provides no 
sense of order and predictability in such matters; it undercuts 
the orderly consistent administration of zoning issues. 
Fourth, the doctrine of judicial restraint precludes forum 
shopping and encourages full presentations of the facts at the 
lowest level and thereby fosters judicial economy. Without 
1ur1irial restraint, a court would be free to reverse a legal and 
r0asonable decision of the Board just because a given judge did 
not agree with the decision. Unsuccessful petitioners would thus 
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be rro t iva t ed to seek a sympathetic judge and increase further 
hearings, not on error, but on the second hite theory. 
Alternatively, strategies of less than full disclosure in the 
administrative hearing could be indulged in, knowing that an 
excessive or unreasonable reauest could he moni fied at the 
following judicial hearing. Neither of these tactics is worthy 
of encouragement. 
The necessity and importance of what iudicial restraint 
means in reviewing zoning board decisions is explained in 
Yackley, Zoninq Law and Practice, 2nd Edition, Volume 1 at p. 479 
quoted in the Colorado case of Levy v. Board of Adjustment of 
Arapahoe County, 141 Colo. 493, 369 P.2d 991 (1962). It noted: 
"lt is a well settled proposition of zoning law 
that a court will not substitute its judqment for 
the judgment of the board. The court may not feel 
that the decision of the board was the best that 
could have been rendered under the circum-
stances. It may thoroughly disagree with the 
reasoning by which the board reached its 
decision. It may feel that the decision of the 
board was a substandard piece of logic and 
thinking. Nonetheless, the court will not set 
aside the board's review of the matter just to 
inject its own ideas into the picture of 
things." ~- at p. 994. 
The lower court, being an experienced jurist, well knew this 
principle and properly declined to appoint himself to the City's 
Board of Anjustment. In so doing, the court properly exercisec1 
the requisite and appropriate self-restraint required in 
appellate review and this Court should affirm. 
F. NO ASSUMPTION CAN BE MADE OR INFERRED AS TO 
WHETHER THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE COURT'S 
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.JUDGMENT WOULD CHANGE ITS AFFIRMATION OF THE 
ROA RD'S DECISION. 
l~ere is nothing except conjecture to assume the lower court 
1uJ6 reverse its ruling if it had ignored judicial restraint and 
s1JIJ,.t1t11ted its judgment for the reasonable act of the Board. 
The inference from a minute entry allowing the injunctive relief 
in "ontinue pending appeal (R 98) is unjustified. The Court 
rlarif ied in its order by interlineation that a stay was 
conditioned upon complying with existi~g statutory and procedural 
rules. (R 119). 
The Peard could more justifiably point to bench rulinqs and 
the clarification on the stay, and most importantly its finding 
of reasonahility, to assert the court if it substituted its 
judgment, would affirm the decision. It is more credible, but is 
speculation without the proposed findings. 
If the existing law of appellate review is judicially 
reversed, and if the support is not clear as a matter of law, no 
inference can be supported that the judge would do anything 
except affirm its decision as this Court should do. 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY HELD THE BOARD'S DECISION 
WAS VALID BEING NEITHER AND NOT ILLEGAL NOR· 
IMPROPER DESPITE ALLEGATIONS OF IRREGULAR-
ITIES AND WAS SUPPORTED BY THE. EVIDENCE. 
The Jorgensens objected to the lower court making any 
Findings of Fact to advise this Court wha.t it considered 
siynificant in reaching a decision that the Board of Adjustment's 
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decision was proper; thus, they have little standinq to now 
speculate on what the lower court would have done if the policy 
decision were the Court's to make. Parrell V. Turner, 25 U.2il, 
351, 482 P.2d 117 (1971). However, for the Court's convenience, 
in response to errors cited at p. 15 of appellants' Brief, we 
draw its attention to the following: 
1. Appellant-Jorgensens allegation of creatinq adverse 
neighborhood reaction by the notice's clerical error in Case 889] 
(describing the use as a "registered home preschool "as opposed 
to "registered home day care") is without merit. The unrebutted 
facts uneouivocally show the neighbors involved knew what 
Mrs.Jorgensen was doing, regardless of its name. Further, people 
in attendance March 22, 1982 were informed of the error at the 
beginning of the hearing, so that there was no confusion on 
anyone's part, including the Board's. In addition, a careful 
reading of the letters submitted by neighbors not attending the 
hearing, shows their objections were based, not on a particular 
activity, but on a philosophical opposition to what they 
considered the negative impact of a business operating in their 
Neighborhood. They considered any commercial business an 
unwelcane and threatening encroachment of the peaceful enjoyment 
of their homes and environment. See, App. B, #44, 42 and 
footnotes, and expanded factual background in Exhibit, D-2. 
The clerical error did not create the adverse reaction; it 
already existed. The error was immediately corrected, no harm 
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r,. n•rred and no one acted in confusion. Jorgensens claim of 
1
,,-c 1 11dicicil error is meritless and unsupported in the record. 
2. The alleged error in failure to inspect the interior of 
,l•Jrgf'nsens' home is without factual foundation. The record 
,evPals that at least three of the five members of the Board had 
l·Pen by the Jorgensen property and were familiar with the 
Neighhorhood in which it was located. (R 57) Further, the Court 
person<1lly acknowledged his personal knowledge of that 
11 eiahborhood from the bench. 
Joroensens' allegation demonstrates that they did not 
unrlerstand the Board's duty was not to determine if they were 
cornplyinq with DFS regulations governing care; rather, it was to 
ensure that the use was a compatible use within the setting of 
its immediate surrounding Neighborhood.' DFS and the Health 
Department had a different function of inspecting and controling 
the interior condition and operation of the business; they had no 
jurisdiction over the zoning issues. 
3. The alleged error· of assuming the Neighborhood was 
predominantly composed of elderly neighborhood is contrary to the 
evidence. This argument is ludicrous because it requires this 
Court, the lower court and the Board to blindfold their eyes to 
the appearance of the ten individuals that had appeared before 
rnp Board in the various hearings or the ability to do simple 
Jrithmatic in reading written responses made from people living 
1 n a place for over 22 years. (Exhibits P-1 and D-2). 
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Jorqensens did not contest the truth of this analysis of U,r 
Neiqhborhood - as used within the significant 85' parameter. 
They only say it is not supported by the express statements in 
the part of the record to which they wanted to limit the lower 
court. They did not proffer or bring in one piece of evidence to 
prove that the existence of other preschoolers in that immediate 
Neighborhood, or that at least 5 of 8 parcel owners are not 
retired and the remainder (1) either have no children, or (2) 
have older children. 
4. Appellant-Jorgensens' alleged error that the Board 
believed that a permit must be denied if there was anv 
neighborhood opposition, is simply an erroneous characterization 
of the record. First, the Board Findings show the Board clearly 
had before it the ordinance itself with the operative language. 
(R 22). It was filed in Case 8891. Ex. P-1. Further, the Board 
had received instruction from both appellant and City counsel. 
( R 2 2-23). In addition, the Board had been directly involved and 
knew of the change requiring the creation of a public forum. It 
had independent knowledge of the legislative intent. (R 16-23, 
74-76, Ex. D-2). 
Mr. Jorgensen's comment suggesting the contrary appears to 
be a quote; however, in fact, it is not taken from a verbatim 
transcript. The explanation of the context of the statement was 
made by the Board's staff, as set forth in the affidavit of Mr. 
Mark Rafey. (R 76). If appellant-Jorgensen was concerned with 
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,,, 0,, 1tinq the verbatim record, it could have required the tape 
Lranscribed. 15 The alleged tainting impact of one isolated 
staUmPnt in a lengthy proceedinq spanning two meetings was 
1·,,·uperly ruled by the lower court not to be determinative and not 
proved correct by appellant-Jorgensen. 
5. Appellant-Jorgensens' alleged error that the Board based 
its finding of a nuisance solely on the fact opposition appeared 
is untrue. Evidence before the Board included: (a) a near 
tragic incident resulting from rambunctious but unsuspectinq 
preschoolers under the Jorgensens' care who were outside the 
premises, requiring frightened and concerned neighbors to 
pr act ice extraordinary caution; ( b) inconvenience and conflict 
between Jorgensens' patrons and adjoining property owners because 
these patrons failed to respect the need to keep private 
driveways clear; and (c) narrow streets; (d) the location of the 
Jorgensens' home which is on a winding portion of a street; (e) 
lack of off street parking for two families and the extra traffic 
burden of the business which generated 6-10 traffic trips for the 
children; ( f) the home used as a duplex by two families, had a 
density and intensity of use not common in the particular 
S'Jrroundi ng Neighborhood. Inherently, the use generated twice 
thp average demands and level of activity even without the 
1'1 
The tape is not considered the official record but is held and 
maintained 90 days to allow its availability to supplement the 
official record if necessary. (R 76). 
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business use of a day care center; and (q) evidence of annoyi~ 
dog barking caused by the childrens' activities. See App. B #!J, 
33, 34, 41, 42. 
6. Appellants' argument that the Roa rd erred in cons id er inc 
the un igue demographics features of the Neighborhood, composed of 
many elderly people and suggesting they are not "ordinary" or~ 
average age, demonstrates the Jorgensens' failure to understand 
the legislative charge to determine compatibility of uses. The 
criteria required that the conditional uses "not change the 
character of the home or neighborhood" (§51-6-14(2)(a)(b), App. 
D, R 34); as such, the Board had the duty to determine the 
Neighborhood's characteristics. 
Additionally there has been nothing proven by appellants ~ 
show that the annoyances complained of 'and objections raised by 
these neighbors were anything but a normal and ordinary reaction 
to burdens imposed by artificially importing a day care business 
into a residential neighborhood. There is nothing to show all of 
these respected residents were not people of normal and ordinary 
sensitivity. 
7. Appellants' allegation that there was a lack of evidence 
to support the Board's evaluation of the operation or activities 
of the day care business is meritless. 
above. 
See facts in paragraph 5, 
It is true that all of the testimony offered by neighbors 
may not have been relevant to the issue before the Board, but the 
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,,.,,.,1 is an administrative fact-finder. Like a court, it must 
-,f: a11d wPigh the evidence and discard the chaffe. This was in 
-,_ 1 done as evidenced by Board member Lewis' statement that 
,,,_,"had hc•en testimony missing the issue. (R 61). It 
,Jprnonstrates Board members are skilled in discardinq the 
irrPlevant and using the germane factors. Interestingly, it was 
1~r. Lewis that nDVed to deny the permit on April 5, 1982. (R 
64). 
8. The allegation of error caused by two board members 
voting at the final meeting who did not attend the earlier public 
hearing on March 22, 1982 fails to consider: (1) that the minutes 
of March 22nd had been distributed and were as agenda items for 
approval; thus, the evidence was within their knowledge; (2) Mr. 
Lewis moved, Mr. Callister seconded and the vote was 5 to 0 (R 
64); thus, even with the exclusion of the votes by Mr. Kelly and 
Mr. Dunn would not change the result. There is no evidence to 
suggest that the result would have been different if only the 3 
members present had voted on the issue and the two other members 
had excused themselves, as Jorgensens suggest was required. 
9. The alleged failure to notify Mrs. Jorgensen of the 
April 5th meeting is not accurate and is contrary to the 
evioence. The minutes specifically note that at the beginning of 
che March 22, 1982 meeting the Board chairman explained the 
Board's procedure. He explained that after the advertised 
h~drinqs were completed, the Board would proceed with 
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deliberation on the agenda i terns. He specifically informed aJJ 
those present that all discussions would be open and they cnuJrl 
stay and listen. People are informed if the>y do not choose to 
stay, they can call and find out what happened, before written 
Findings are mailed two weeks later. ( R 5 7, App. B # 3 8). 
Further, on March 22, 1982, after its deliberations, the 
Board specifically voted to hold Case 8891 for two weeks (the 
date of its next meeting) for the opportunity to involve the 
entire Board. (R 22, 55). Having continued deliberations to a 
date certain in an open meeting, even courts would not have 
renoticed parties. 
On April 5, 1982, Case 8891 was not discussed as a public 
hearing agenda item, but was on the latter deliberation agenda i 
an open meeting. The minutes clearly show no new testimony from 
interested parties was taken. Staff reviewed the background and 
testimony from the "earlier hearing" held March 22 and the 
criteria of the ordinance. (R 63-64). 
Mrs. Jorgensen and her counsel could have attended if th~ 
had so chosen. They attended similar continued deliberations in 
Case 8457 (R 18). There is no evidence that Jorgensens did not 
have actual notice; absent meeting that burden of proof, this 
Court should presume they had the notice they should have 
obtained by staying and personally knowing of the decision. 
Alternatively they are estopped from denying notice because they 
could have obtained it by following instructions offered by the 
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.it•I co cnntact it. Mrs. ,Jorgensen's non-appearance at the 
1
,,; 1 Sth meeting was a self-imposed action over which she had 
rr r·l (~t e C()ntrol. 
Liistly, Mrs. ,Joroensen's failure to appear was of no 
pi·ejurlicial harm because no hearing occurred. The only thing 
,- 011 tiriued were the Floard's deliberations. These were done in an 
o~Pn anrl public meeting; however, the Board received no new 
testimony from interested parties and the deliberations were 
.::oflfined to the Board and its staff (R 63-4). No violations of 
due process occurred. 
10. Appellant's argument that the Board was reauired to 
impose conditions to make the incompatible day care business less 
incompatible with this Neighborhood misconstrues the purpose of 
the City ordinance. The ordinance's provisions set the criteria 
and establish the forum for Neighborhoods to express their 
positions. It is not the Board's legal duty to find a way to 
inject this business into this Neiohborhood. 
Further, it is significant to note that the denial of a 
permit was not a complete bar to use of Jorgensens' home to 
generate income. Appellants were still permitted a use of more 
limited intensity. They could have a "home occupation" use if 
limited to two children. 
Plaintiffs' allegations of prejudicial harm or error was 
'"dtlP to the lower court. After conducting its full and complete 
, .... ;ew of the evidence before the Floard, discussed above the 
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court found the record sustained the Board's action. ( R 118). 
Its decision was a proper analysis and should be affirmed, 16 
VI I. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court, in considering the Board's decision 
challenged in this case, applied the correct principles of law 
and conducted a plenary and thorough judicial scrutiny of that 
decision. It fully reviewed the record and evidence of the 
administrative Board and properly ruled that it acted lawfully 
within its delegated authority. Further its decision was 
suppcrted by the evidence before it and was not arbitrary, 
capricious nor unreasonable. The record clearly supports the 
decision of the trial court, and the lower court should be 
affirmed. 
Appellant-Jorgensens' argument that the Court should become 
the super Board of Adjustment is not suppcrted by any relevant 
authority; further, it is contrary to the sound administration of 
justice and the principle of separation of powers. Appellants' 
theory would unwisely require this Court to reverse the cases of 
1611 The responsibility of this court to review the evidence in 
equity cases, it will not disturb the findings of facts made 
below unless they appear to be clearly erroneous and against t~ 
weight of the evidence. In conducting our review of the 
evidence, we are of course, mindful of the advantageous position 
of the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses, and we are 
constrained to give due deference to the decisions by reasons 
thereof." McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996 (Utah, 1978) 
(Emphasis added). 
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. t"''w'"'~ fl_~iqh_!~, Peatross and Crestview, and would create law 
'·, _ir'I to that recognized throughout the country. 
,1, 1•xisting appellate standard of review properly applied 
1 1 ~_lie> lower court adequately al 1 ows the Court to make a ful 1, 
c.plcte and meaningful review and determination of whether or 
net ilfl ,cidministrative act is legal and reasonably related to 
nP<lible evidence. Thus, it protects aggrieved parties from 
in e:oponsihle abuse of discretion. 
The lower court correctly performed its duty of review. The 
a~pellant-Jorgensens failed to meet their burden of proof to 
0 vercurne the validity of this specialized administrative hearing 
Board. Therefore the lower court's decision should be affirmed. 
DATRD this day of November, 1983. 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
JUDY F. LEVER 
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IN '!'HE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
i•Ji,l'E: M. JORGENSEN and 




SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a body corporate and 
politic under the laws of 
the State of Utah, and THE 




ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C 82-4134 
This matter came on for hearing before the Court 
on the 2nd day of December, 1982 before the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin, District Judge. The plaintiffs were represented by 
Michael R. Murphy of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
and the defendants by Judy F. Lever, Assistant City Attorney. 
The Court preliminarily ruled that the statutory 
basis for plaintiffs' claims, Section 10-9-15, U.C.A. (1953), 
providing a person aggrieved by the action of a municipal 
huard of adjustment with a plenary action for review, does 
•1Ut contemplate, allow or necessitate a trial de novo. 




The Court received with no objection~ the record 
1,..trJT e <he Board of Adjustment for Salt Lake City in Case 
tj" B891 (1982). The Court received over the objection of 
1
,1 .intiffs the record before the Board of Adjustment for 
.1lt L.1ke City in Case No. 8457 (1980). The Court then 











p1oceecl0d to hear the argument of counsel and took the matter 
und"r advisement. Now, having considered the argument of 
coun::;el and having reviewed the entire record the Court is 
of the opinion that its role pursuant to Section 10-9-15, 
u.c.A. (1953) is circumscribed and limited to the scope of 
review traditionally employed by a court of appellate juris-
diction. It is therefore the ruling of this Court that the 
dcecision of the Board of Adjustment is entitled to a pre-
sur11ption of validity, that there is -. evidence in the 
record to support the decision of the Board, that to reverse 
the decision of the Board would be to substitute this Court's 
judgment for that of the Board which would be inappropriate 
under Section 10-9-15, U.C.A. (1953), and that the decision 
of the Board was not arbitrary or capricious. 
Counsel for all parties appeared before the Court 
on the 6th day of May, 1983, to argue and consider the proper 
form and extent of order and judgment in this case and 
following said argument the Court deems the form of order 
and judgment suggested by plaintiffs to be appropriate. 
--
--- ---......---~-·---·-.._; ____ .,, .. 
~ .:_... ... 
, 111 i'Lf°Of<E, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
,1.,, .J····1·;ion of the Board of Adjustment in Case No. 8891 
"If i r rncd and upheld, that plaintiffs' Complaint 
,1, , d w1 Lh prejudice, O:a:±:CiiEl::::::~-~-·g1 6'i~~;:;::;m1;:i1;i:1~~5£p;i';iii::::z::c:;•~1<t-
,,;:· __ Y, ll1,,t this ORDER Al'lD JUDGMENT and appropriate action 
"' ,- .,,,J..·r by dcfcmL:rnts be stayed pending expiration of 
1_:, .. sL.ilulory appeal period and, if an appeal hereof is 
i. 1111 .~ly pursued by either plaint~iff said, stay .shall~ 
clur1~ rwn.Jcncy o!t. t~l~ ~ • 
/-:/ ~this~_h_day of I , 1983. 
APPENDIX EXHIBIT B 
DETAILED STATEMENT OF FACTS 
".f"'ntlPnt agrees that in order to consider the issues 
.·'1 >cl •n .• pp0al this Court must have the background information 
11 ·:~n to the lower court that was before the Board, including the 
,,dclit innal statute and ordinance framework in which the disp~te 
''''" dnd was resolved by the Board and lower court. 
/"\. Legislative Framework regarding Day Care providers. 
1. In 1943, the legislature of the State of Utah recognized 
th.1t µroviding child care for minor children was a business 
activity which required licensing and regulation. To that end, 
chapter 16 of the Laws of Utah of 1943 was passed enacting what 
is now found at Sections 55-9-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended. 
Said chapter provides aeneral regulatory and administrative 
rulemaking power to state agencies, imposes penalties and 
sac,ctions for violations and requires licensing when care is 
being provided for three or more minor children in lieu of care 
a~ supervision ordinarily provided by parents in their own homes 
for periods of more than 4 but less than 24 hours in any one 
day. Rl6. Said rules are 7urrently administered by the Division 
of Family Services, "DFS". 1 An excerpt of Section 55-9-1, Utah 
Code Annotated is attached as Appendix Ex. C. --
2. Subsequently, the City enacted Chapter 13 of Title 18 of 
the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 1964 as amended 
establishing complimentary standards related to general health 
and sanitation conditions under the supervision of the Health 
Department for such care providers which applied, whether 
children were cared for 4+ hours as a "day care center" or under 
4 hours/day as a "preschool" or "hourly day care center." Rl6,· 
J 1. 
3. Prior to passage of Bill 78 of 1981, group child day was 
1\1ndPr the power of Section 55-9-1, et seq. U.C.A., DFS has 
µrorn11lgated administrative rules explicitly creating two types of 
care facilities: (1) Family Day Care for small groups of 6 or 
less in a provider's home where her preschoolers count, and (2) 
Child Care Centers for groups of 7+. Rl6, 17. Implicitly two 
'nditional types remain: (3) all preschools, nurseries, etc. 
' . 'hne a child stays 4 hours or less per day, and (4) care for not 
more than 2 children. Rl6-18, 73. 
'innz1•d hy City zoninq ordinances as permitted uses in a 
, i1,1,"rhr1od Business "B-3" district, and was available as a 
, 1,' 1"nal use with other commercial-residential businesses in 
H1·~1dential"R-6" mixed use district. The "R-6" conditional 
I 1 "'l t rPquired Board approval after favorable findinas on 
11 ,. 1 ~1 , r·itPria laid out in Section 51-18-7, Revised Ordinances 
uf :'"lt L_c3.ke _ _Ci_!Y_, Utah as amended were satisfied. Rl6, 26, and 
/4. - .. -
4. In JTOre restricted residential zones, "R-1" through "R-
, c~nmercial activity is generally prohibited to protect 
1 a~ntial areas as sanctuaries for family life and well 
tcrng. Rl6, 26, 74, 78. The predominant zoning in Salt Lake 
City's r:esiclential districts comprised of low density single 
and/or two family dwellings is the Residential "R-2" district. 
see AppPndix A, Joraensens' Brief. 
5. Restricted residential districts such as the "R-2" zone, 
do not authorize the operation of commercial activities from a 
h0me unless the business is of such an incidental nature that it 
ccin gual i fy as a home occupation accessory use. Rl6, 74-75. 
6. Home occupations han been defined by the City in Section 
51-2-34 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah. R-
34. llowever Jorgensens elected to only cite a portion while 
omi tling unfavorable language therein. The complete or plenary 
definition is attached as Appendix Ex. E. The legislative format 
shows the ordinance with 1981 admending language in under-
lining. See also Ex. P-1, R33. 
7. The language omitted clearly reflects an underpinning 
principle that while the accessory use may unconspicuously 
accommoriate a resident's productivity and talent, group 
activities and instruction were specifically precluded because 
they attract groups of people to invade a neighborhood with 
attendant increases of traffic trips, parking demand, activity, 
elc. Individuals may tutor or teach music lessons, etc. to 
individuals from home, but group teaching is prohibited. Rl6-
J4. Group instruction was not a permitted use for day care, 
music, dance or charm schools, etc. until the "B-3" zone. R26, 
7 6. 
8. At least two other cases involving the zoning issues of 
child care facilities preceeded Case No. 8457 before the Board. 
Those cases clealt with preschools desiring either to be granted 
an "R-6" conditional use approval or approval in "R-2" districts 
oo p11hl i c schools, as opposed to commercial specialty schools 
~ui red to be located in the "B-3" district. The Board had 
''JUV;tr.'<l comprehensive revision. Rl8, 29, 75: Ex. D-2 
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g_ nrs left the responsibility of gettinq approval from 
1 1 ~uthorities for business licenses, zoning, building fire 
11• dl th cnde reaui rements up to its licensees. R-18 Ffndinqs 
1 r iSe No. 8457, Def. Ex. 2, R20-22, 59-61, Findings Case No.· 
:;'!l, Pl. Ex. l. 
ti. ()_r'iqination of the Initial Controversy. 
10. Jorgensen's reside in Salt Lake City, Utah at 1398 
l'ichigan Avenue. This is an established low density residential 
neighborhood where the homes appear to be single dwellings 
although duplexes are allowed in the zoned Residential "R-2". 
Rl6-18, 20-21, 58-61, 63-64, 122. 
11. ,Jorgensen's home is a duplex which was occupied at the 
relevant time, at least in 1982 by two families. R21, 60. 
12. Mrs. Jorgensen began the business of providing care for 
other children in her home for pay on a regular basis in 1978. 
R-16, Finding of Case No. 8457, Def. Ex. 2. 
13. Contrary to plaintiff's statement on the number of 
children being tended, the original application statement 
indicated that approximately 10 chi 1 "ren were regularly being 
cared for al though it averaged between 3-6 on individual days. 
These children were in addition to her own preschooler plus 2 
children of school age. Additional children were tended on an 
infrequent basis. Affidavit of Diane Jorgensen, "Jorgensen Aff." 
Exhibit D-2, R-11. 
14. During early 1978 through December 1981, Mrs. Jorgensen 
operated her business: without a license or approval from DFS; 
without a permit from the Health Department; and without a 
business license or any other form of review or approval by the 
City. This is true notwithstanding the fact the approvals were 
required by then existing ordinances and law. Rl7, 66, 74, 
Jorqensen Aff. Ex. D-2. 
15. The City had no knowledge of Jorgensen's 
1980 when the next door neighbors complained about 
inquired of the legality of the day care business. 




16. The City investigated the complaint in its normal 
pruress of zoning enforcement. rt verified she was operating an 
unauthorized use in the "R-2" district and issued an appropriate 
notice. Rl2, 16, 74-75, letter of October 2, 1980 of Ex. D-2. 
17. Jorgensens appealed this staff ruling to the Board, 
cc 11r 0 st i ng the use was allowed in the "R-2" district under the 
-3-
r.-•ml? c1r(·upat ion exemption. 
11 tf. nf ~x. f)-2. 
Notice of Zoning Appeal, Jorgensen 
11', The ,Jorgensens' request for an interpretation, known as 
H4~7. was originally heard as a public hearing agenda item 
t 1,e Hc,ci rrl on 10 /14 /8 0. Jorg ensens' contested it was not a 
,1 •er,'s day care center but a qualified home occupation in the 
" "nnc. RJ6, Case 8457 Findings, Ex. D-2. '1_,. 
19. Counsel entered his appearance and Jorgensens with 
'"'un•cpJ wc>re present at the hearing. Entry, Ex. D-2, Case 8457 
pinrlinqs, Rl6-19. In addition 12 other residents of that 
ne iahborhood attended and presented the Board a statement 
opp~sing the Jorgensens' position that bore 27 names of 
resirlents/r'wners. Ex. D-2. This croup included property owners 
0 f at least 8 parcels residing on Michigan Avenue within one-half 
bl1ck of Jorgensens' home and 2 representatives of a church 
abutting .Jorgensens' rear yeard. Rl6-19, Ex. D-2. 
20. Obviously, the record does not specify the age of these 
individuals but reflects the Board saw them and heard their 
rlefinite opinion that a strict construction should occur 
precluding encroachment of businesses into their neighborhood. 
R-16-19, contents of Case 8457 Ex. D-2. If their age had been 
specified, it is uncontested that 10 of the 12 residents present 
were or are of near retirement age or older. The two excepted 
were the church representatives, who did not live on Michigan 
~.·1er1ue. Rl6, Case 8457, Ex. D-2. 
21. At that hearing, the record reflects several neighbors 
voicing heated objections for a variety of reasons (including 
nuisance an~ concerns of safety, traffic, noise and zoning 
policy) to the Board making an interpretation which would 
legalize Jorgensens' business a~ a home occupation in their 
neighborhood. Rl6-19, Ex. D-2. 8 
18Judge Faux, a next door neighbor, described conditions and/or 
in~idents relating to the businesses' operation and testified of 
confrontations with a parent who parked blocking Faux 's 
driveway. He was concerned about safety because of close 
proximity of his driveway, sidewalks, traffic, and lack of off-
ctreet area for playing and for the transportation of children by 
parents. 
Mr. Thompson voiced concerns about the traffic and noise beinq 
g2nerated. 
Mccc. Barker, and Roaer Van Frank in written form, expressed 
lluotnnte continued) 
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22. On 10/14/80 the Board concluded the hearing. Later 
!lint night in dPliberations it held it over and requested a legal 
•
1
,i,,i'"' v1hich was oiven orally at its deliberations at the next 
... ir1C1 on 10/27/80. The Board was informed of the pending draft 
,•.~I ,,f a 1 i bPral izing ordinance revision addressing child 
, "'' 1 lit ies. It attempts to dovetail into DFS classifi-
,,., ,,s ronditional uses into their existing zoning and health 
"v,c'•'S regu 1 at i ng childcare. Rl6-78. 
21. Contrary to statements in Jorgensens' brief, the record 
shows their counsel attended both Board meetings including 
dclit,c:rations on 10/27/80. Jorgensens and their counsel 
rxercised their opportunity to present their supporting testimdny 
and evidence to the Board and confront opposing witnesses and 
rcsponrl to their testimony during the public hearing. Similarly 
Jorgc-risel"s' exercised their right to observe the Boards' 
deliberations continued to 10/27/80 and commented during the 
Boncd's discussion. Rl8, Ex. D-2. 
24. Lacking power to adopt legislation according to its 
cluty Lo interpret existing ordinances, the Board ruled 
Jorgensens' business did not qualify under the home occupation 
definition thus violating zoning which it ordered to be corrected 
in 10 days. Rl8. The written Findings and Order of Case 8457 
was filed 11/10/80 and a copy thereof mailed to Jorgensens. Rl8, 
Ex. D-2. 
C. First Lawsuit and Ordinance Revision. 
25. Challenging the Board's ruling in Case 8457, Jorgensens 
initiated litigation in the Third District Court seeking 
19 declaratory and injunctive relief from the Court. Rl0-23. 
26. Jorgensens obtained a preliminary injunction allowing 
Mrs. Jorgensen to continue her business. However the injunction 
was granted ~ after Mrs. Jorgensen agreed and was required to 
obtain DFS licensing (requiring a reduction of the number of 
children cared for to a maximum of six children, including the 
prov id er' s own children) and to otherwise comply with the terms 
of the proposed ordinance draft. R20, 21, 59, 33, 36 and Ex. D-
" 
27. The proposed ordinance draft, as it applied to family 
0 upport of the zoning policy to protect residential areas from 
c0 mmercial encroachment changing the character and quality of 
their neighborhood. 
19·~0toensen v. Salt Lake City Corp., Case No. 80- 9531. 
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dJV carr proposed that such businesses or "Licensed Babysitters" 
;,]cl lk concli t ion ally approved by zoning staff as a conditional 
,~, ('' ,,v tdPrl they were DFS licensed and agreed to comply with 
. ,~in local requirements. No hearing was required unless there 
· .11 1ec1ations raised by complaints of violations. Then the 
.", "uJ,·l review the matter after a hearing. Page 3, Section 
•.21 J'''J['nc;en nraft, Defendant's Exhibit D-2. 
28. The legislative consideration of the child care 
,, 1 di11anr·e revision was drawn out due to heated controversy raised 
by c1ffecte9 special interests groups with cowpeting inter"st~. O The City Council ultimately modified the revisions 
to reriui re "registered home day care" providers to seek a 
conditional use permit in order to operate their regulated 
business in their homes. Each request must be considered 
individually by the Board after a noticed public hearing, unless 
the applicant submitted the written consent from all property 
nwners within a 85' perimeter of the property herein referred to 
as "Neighborhood." 21 R33-34, 76. 
29. Said Bill No. 78 of 1981 was passed 10/29/81 becoming 
effective on 11/1/81 upon its publication. R33-36. A copy is 
attaached as Appendix Ex. D as the new ordinance. 
30. The Bill was a dramatic but not unqualified 
liberalization. The Council intentionally took one step back 
from the proposed draft to ensure each conditional use was either 
supported in writing by its Neighborhood or was submitted to 
individual review by the Board ~~ere a forum was provided for 
neighhorhood response or input. R20-23, 33-36, 58-64, 75-76. 
The preamble recognizes benefits of child care conducted in their 
neighborhoods can be compatible in residential zones but notes 
potential adverse impact from the incompatible increased demands 
for parking, traffic, play associated with care facilities, 
etc. R-33. 
31. After passage, the parties stipulated to dismiss the 
Pirst Lawsuit with prejudice. Mrs. Jorgensen agreed without 
20s . 1 . . pec1a interest groups include 
advocates, large scale commercial 
fQffiily day care providers. R29. 
neighborhood protection 
preschool/day care versus 
21s . . h ect1on 51-6-14(2) Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Uta , 
1965 as amended as adopted in Bill 78 of 1981. App. Ex.4. 
_i~, 
iun 51-6-14 (20(a)+(b), Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 




"'' 1 ",1 riqhts to future judicial review, to apply under the 
"-"'""-"''; of the new ordinance. R-4, 20, 59 and Case 8891, Ex. 
<2 The Board and its staff were aware the rrodifications in 
1 11" r;r,;il Bill were more restrictive than the original proposal 
~c ,;c--r iherl in parcigraph 27, Rl6, 25-26, 33-36, and 58-61. The 
gc,,nd undP rs tood its charge to consider whether or not each 
,-r•JJc-alion satisfied the required criteria of the ordinance 
1'.rn'Jllage and spirit. R-20-23, 29-31, 59-64, 74-76. 
o. Second Board Case 
33. On 3/5/82, Mrs. Jorgensen submitted her application for 
, condition al use permit to operate a family day care business 
for S children in her home. It was known as Case 8891. The 
ordinance rlesignates this use as "registered home day care." 
/,pplication, Ex. P-1. 
34. Mrs. Jorgensen represented she then provided services 
fur 8 different children. Four children stayed whole days, four 
came for portions of the day hut with a few exceptions the 
combination averaged 5 each day in addition to her own 
children. (Application attachment, Ex. P-1. 
35. Mrs. Jorgensen identified, as required the 9 parcels 
and property owners within the an 85' parameter of her property, 
herein referred to as "Neighborhood." Ex. P-1. 
36. Case 8891 was scheduled for a public hearing on the 
Bo;ird's agenda of 3/22/82. Notice was mailed to neighbors in the 
85' parameter hereinafter "Neighborhood". Ex. P-1. 
37. By a clerical error said notice described the request 
as a conditional use to operate in an "R-2" district a registered 
home "preschool center" as opposed to "day care". Notice, Ex. P-
l. 
38. On 3/22/82, 3 of 5 Board members or a quorum was 
present, including Louis H. Callister, Jr. acting as Chairman, 
Linda Wilcox and Robert Lewis. The Chairman advised applicants 
of general procedure: (1) each property had been viewed by Board 
Members; ( 2) the public hearings would be conducted then the 
B"ard would deliberate on its actions; (3) people not deciding to 
sLiy 23or deliberation may call to learn the decision or ruling, Ho7, 
'J 
>Vritten findings cannot be approved until after the Board 
1 footnote continued) 
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J~. Tl\ the staff introduction to the hearing on Case 8891 
n 84 'i I und the prior background was capsulized for the Board' 
,. i'"'islative history of the new ordinance's adoption. Th~ 
'"' v inns of the new Bill applicable to the Board's 
(k, :,tion on Registered Home Day Care and the criteria was 
,, d I R-20-23, 59-61) and a copy filed in the Case 8891. 
1-:.;:1-~G, l-q;p~ Fx. D • 
. 1Q. Mrs. Jorgensen appeared with counsel, who made the 
presentation to the Board. Mr. Murphy additionally detailed the 
~tatus of the First Lawsuit, the interim act of obtaining an 
inJunction and DFS licensing for Family Day Care, and his 
client's ab i 1 i ty to comply with the criteria specified in the new 
nrclinance. R20-23, 58-64 Ex. P-1. 
41. The hearing was opened to the public. Of the nine 
parcels in the "Neighborhood" 3 were represented by 4 
indivirluals. Two other parcel owners submitted written 
statements. R21-23, 57-61. All vociferously objected to the 
?.oarrl grant inq Mrs. Jorgensen the privilege to continue operating 
her business in their Neighborhood for a variety of reasons, 
111c111dinq some that were very emotional. R-76. No 
resident/owner of the Neighborhood supporting Jorgensens, if any 
existed, appeared. Mrs. Hayes, an employer of Mrs. Jorgensen's 
services urged the Board to approve the use. Mrs. Jorgensen or 
her attorney enjoyed and exercised opportunity in the hearing to 
confront and respond to Neighborhood complaints. R20-23, 59-6., 
Ex. P-1. 
42. While certain complaints raised by one neighbor may be 
susceptible to a characterization reflecting conflict between 
ne~hbors rather than finely focused on the criteria, the Board 
received important information relevant to its decision on the 
criteria. Such relevant information related among other things 
to: (a) identifying the unique character of the Neighborhood; 
(b) Neighborhood attitudes in perceiving Registered Day Care as 
an incompatible use; (c) traffic and safety; (d) burden in 
24 l'eighhorhood to analyze change; (d) experience in operation. 
approves its minutes two weeks later at the next meeting. 
24
such information coming from Neighborhood testimony included: 
laJ The Board's identification of the age, demographic makeup, 
atlitudes, toleration of the surrounding neighbors bearing the 
areJtest impact of the businesses' operation. This Neighborhood 
was highly concentrated with people of advanced years, without 
di1l rlren, let alone preschoolers. Neighbors considered the 
concentration of importing preschoolers with their attendant 
lfuutnote continued) 
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41 Jn dPliberation after the hearing on 3/22/83 Board 
'''" "" ''"tPd some testimony had not been focused on the 
,•\e- criteria (Mr. Lewis comments R-22, 5). Realizinq its 
,1 '" would be controversial in either event and to dissipate 
ric~c 1,,:J ,,,notions, in open meeting, the Board voted to hold the 
n ,tter for- two weeks to 4/5/82 for discussion by the full 
, 0 1cl. F22, 76. 
44. On 4/5/82 the Board with all 5 members including Mr. 
,~:Jr,n and Kelly again deliberated on the matter, (R62). Each 
11 ,cm!Jer had benefit of proposed minutes of 3/22/82. No witnesses 
testified. Staff Mr. Vernon Jorgensen, rehighlighted the history 
of cases 8457 and 8891. The Board's counsel again directed its 
attention to the criteria of the new Bill 38 of 1981. R22-23, 
s 5, 5 7 ,, fi 1-2 , 6 4 , 7 5 and 7 6. 
noise, enPrgy, play patterns, etc. as an undesirable change. R-
57-60. 
(h) Neighbors perceived Jorgensens' business a commercial 
1nterprise for Jorgensens' gain at the Neigborhood's expense. 
Th~ir expense was continued loss of their right to a private, 
prcterted noncommercial residential area in which they had 
ir:vPsted decades of their lives, energy and resources. The 
business was perceived as being incompatible, imposing burdens of 
'Tiurc intensive use. The changes were perceived as: downgrading 
their quiet Neighborhood, not being artificially caused they were 
not reauired to tolerate or accommodate the changes. R22, 23, 
59-60, Stocking and Thompson letters Ex. P-1. 
(c) Jorgensens' home was a wedge shaped parcel with narrow 
frontage on Michigan Avenue. Here the street is on a slope and 
'"inas. There is not appropriate space for the increased need for 
0ffstreet parking for delivery, and neighbor's driveways can be 
easily blocked by parking near the sidewalk. (Field trip, 
Jll1;stration and photograph of Ex. P-1, Illustration). 
(d) Changes increasing density and intensity of use. In a 
lki9l1borhood used primarily for single families, the Jorgensens' 
hrime, being used by two families (R21, 57) already generated 
twice the average demands for parking, traffic, outdoor 
tP''rcation area, etc. The proposed use for traffic alone could 
3 ~~ 10-14 daily extra traffic trips just for child transportation 
1as·,uminq two trips per child per day). 
ie) Acr11al operation aenerated complaints of annoying noise from 
g2nnal activity and Jorgensens' dog's unusual barking when 
'hi 1 <l r en er i ed. R2 4. The annoyances was not speculative but 
r,,dl reaction to actual continuing problem. 
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45. Rased on the information received at the earlier 
1
,, cJl·111'< of 3/22/82, and its knowledge of the property and 
rt i q til•o rhood, the Boa rd col le ct ively concluded the proposed use 
·1 i.1 n"t mPet the criteria and therefore unanimously 5/0 denied 
:1,. ,.,,nclitional use, noting Jorqensens could still care for a 
_1,,-,1 J,·r· qroups - not to exceed two. R22-3, 64. 
~ f. Al 1 i terns includin<:i Case 8891, considered in the open 
meeting of April 5 were noticed as required by law on that date 
''"~ 8891 was considered in the deliberation portion of the 
i<ceting. Tnasmuch as deliberations on Case 8891 had been 
"''nee.sly continued and calendared on 3/22/82 to 4/5/82 any and 
all interested parties present on 3/22/82 either knew of the 
rJate, or left before the decision was made and failed to inquire 
as instrr1cted. 
47. The Board's action was reduced to writing in Findings 
(R-16-23) and officially filed on or about 4/19/82. 2 ~ 
E. Second Lawsuit 
48. On 5/19/82, Jorgensens filed their Complaint and 
Petition for Relief from the Board's decision in Case No. 8891. 
R2-2 3. 
49. In the dismissal of the First Lawsuit, 26 Mrs. Jorgensen 
agreed to comply with the Board's decision in the Second Case 
until and unless she could secure a judicial stay. R21. Mrs. 
Jorgensen states she reduced her care to two children the first 
week of June 1982. R66-67. 
SO. On 8/16/82 Jorgensens secured a preliminary injunction 
25 The related portion of the Board's actual minutes of 3/22/82 
and 4/5/82 were before the Court at R57-64 together with the 
findings and Order which are prepared by extracting and 
collecting minute excerpts for each case. Rl6-23. Minutes as 
the official record are prepared from a verbatim tape. The tape 
is to assist in preparation of minutes and generally is not 
transcribed and is destroyed after 90 days. R76. Findings are 
prepared and are signed only after the minutes of the final 
meeting are approved which occurred concurrently in this case on 
4/19/82. The documents before the Board together with any 
statRments, etc. are retained in the Board's file which is known 
as the Cdse. The certified contents of cases 8891 and 8457 were 
1 c-;pcct ively by the Court in Exhibits P-1 and D-2. 
26
DeLailed Statement of Fact No. 26. 
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to authodzc the continuation of day care for 5 preschoolers 
irntil J/2/83. An expedited trial setting was approved as was 
1 , _,·,·e to p_qu 1·st an extension if final judgment were not entered 
- "1<l d:ite. R87-88. 
1 l The Board filed a Motion in Limini to be heard prior to 
1 un t2/2/82 for the Court to determine: its scope of review 
;1,e cYt"' if t1·ial or review it would conduct, the type of ' 
,· 1 dcn•~ Lo be received; and Jorgensens' burden of proof to 
11 1 t JmatPl y focus the issue before the Court. 
52. The Court from the bench did not rule on each issue on 
th2 1notion, but clid rule prior to trial: 
(1) That it did not intend to set aside the Board's 
ruling unless it found it to be arbitrary and capricious 
being unsupported by the evidence before the Board or 
1 11eqa1 • 
(2) That it would not conduct an evidentiary trial de 
novo and would confine itself to issues, evidence and 
information before the Board when it made its ruling. 
Evidence, information or testimony not before the Board 
would not be received. 
53. Based on those rulings and taking the rest under 
advisement the matter proceeded to trial. Both parties had 
witnesses available. Inquiring as to whether the Court had 
before it all of the record and information before the Board, the 
Board's counsel informed the Court it had a portion of the record 
in the form of the Findings and Minutes (R53-64) and documents in 
the file hut that the rest was available and intended to be 
introduce as exhibits. The Court indicated it wanted the entire 
record and information before the Board in order to conduct its 
analysis. 
54. Plaintiff then had the certified contents of Case No. 
8891 marked as its Exhibit P-1. The Board offered the additional 
certified contents of Case No. 8457 on the basis that it was 
necessary background information: (1) Obviously within the 
Board's knowledge; ( 2) Before the Board and expressly discussed 
by the Board and plaintiff at the time it made its decision in 
C0>se 8 8 91: ( 3) Pl aced before the Court as necessary information 
'1n Jorgensen's Complaint; and (4) To deny its admission would 
PrPvent the Court from making a complete review of the Board's 
dction. 
55. The Court also received illustrative Exhibits D-3 
1-ul,rlil'ision plat) and an illustration where an aerial photograph 
"' rla irl with property lines reflected the actual development of 
-11-
drt>Pl ~,1<1 pr "perty configurations in the Neighborhood. Exhibit 
[1 ;, 
'·,tJ. nur i ng ar:gument the Court made a finding from the bench 
,.,. curicoulcred the activities of operating small group child 
1 h11s1ness as opposed to the noncommercial 
! "' '-' 1J7at ion painted by Jorgensens. 
0 1. l\ftccr extensive argument where counsel for each side 
·es qi JC'n wirle latitude to argue fr:om the issues and information 
r.,ci.JLE' thP P,oard, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
O:Yt,. 
58. The Court ruled in a minute entry of 12/7/82 in favor 
r.,f the Po'lrd finding no cause of action. R98. 
~9. Proposed Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and a 
prnp,,sed Orrler were pr:epared and submitted with detailed findings 
to rlPmonstrate to a reviewing court, if appealed, the portion of 
I r1e r:ecord argued to the Court upon which the Court relied in 
affirming the Board's decision. Rl21-133. 
60. Jor:gensens filed Objections (Rll2-114) and a subsequent 
r-ropos<C'd combined Order and Judgment. Rll7-119. Primarily the 
ObJection contests not to the truth of matters therein nor that 
Lhe matters were not argued to the Court, but on matters of law 
and form . It submitted that inasmuch as the Court did not 
conduct an evidentiary trial de novo, nor feel it necessary to 
substitute its judgment, findings of the court were neither 
necessary or proper. Plaintiff also objected awarding the Board, 
as prevailing party, its costs. R-112-114. 
61. The Court indicated it had found supporting evidence in 
reviewing the Board's action to affinn the decision. Any 
problems of form in the Findings could be corrected. Jorgensen's 
objected to any findings being made. Noting that a waiver of 
findings would require the Supreme Court on appeal to give 
greater deference to the trial court's discretion, the Court 
agreed to give plaintiff what it sought - a waiver of findings so 
it amended Jorgensens' proposed Order and Judgment by 
interlineation to clarify it: found adequate supporting 
evidence, assessed Jorgensens for the Board's costs, and required 
any stay to satisfy require the normal supersedeas bond 
prucedur:es. Rll 7-119. 
62. The Court made no reference, implication or inference 
as tn what it would rule if the matter had been reviewed as a 
''altH· of original jurisdiction. 
\_ l'8 J 
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT C 
[>5-9-1. Day nurseries-Llcense-Exceptions.-Except as provided bere-
lll, nn <lnJ: nursery, person, ~s:ociation, corporation, institution, or agency 
.d1fill p1 o' ide care and superv1s1on for three or more children under fourteen 
: , 11rt ~if fl.ge in lieu of care ~nd superYision ordinarily provided by parents 
ir1 1licir own homes, for periods of more than four but less than 24 hours 
111 J1!JJ Pne day, with or without clinrge, without ha"t'ing in full force a 
11', 11'.-C i~sued by _or under the RuthoritJ:' of the division of fami1y services, 
nccordance with rules and regoh11lons prescribed by such board of 
fc,n,ily "'nic·es Nothing in this a_ct sha'.I apply to care given to children by 
<ir 1u tht> hnrnes of parents, lcga1 guardians, grandparents, brothers, sisters, 
11nrles or nunts, or as part of the program of an educational instituHon 
1 egulntf'd Ly the boards of education of the state, or as part of the program 
of n parochial educational institution. 
History: L. 1943, ch. 16, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., H Sa.-1; L.. 1969, ch. 197, § 86. 
Cr:rip1lcr's 1'.'"otes.. 
Tbe 1969 :imendment 6ubstituted "divi-
J.ion or family r;crdces .. for "public \<rel-
fare commi6sion" and ''board of family 
,..rn ices'' for "com1ni11sion." 
Title o! Act. 
An act for_tbe re1;ulation and licensing 
of d~y. nurseries, rerflOD! and orc-aniz..ationa 
prondrng d:iy c..:i.re for cbildrf'n.. 
55 9-2. Visitation and inspection.-The rules and regulations prescribed 
by the Loard of family services shall incorporate or provide for standards, 
developed by the division of family services in co-operation with the 
di\'isiun of health and the department of education, assuring the health, 
~afety, welfare and education of the children, and shall provide for such 
visits or inspections by appropriate authorities as may be necessary to ob-
tain compliance with the standards prescribed. Failure to comply with such 
standards shall be cause for revocation of the license. 
Rbtory: L. 1943, ch. 16, § 2; 0. 1943, 
Bupp., 14-8&-2; L. 1969, ch. 197, § 87. 
Compiler's Notes.. 
The 1969 amendment substituted ''board 
ot family services" for "welfare depart-
ment," "division o! family aervices" for 
"auch department" and "the department of 
education" for "state department. of 
health and education." 
55-9-3, Application for and contents of license.-Tbe application for a 
license shall be in a form prescribed by the division of family services. 
The license shall state to whom it is issued, the particular premises where 
the children are to be cared for, the number of children that may be cared 
for at any one time, and the period during which the license will be in force 
and effect. 
Hl.'!Wry: L. 1943, ch. 16, § 3; 0. 1943, Compiler's NoteL 
Supp., 14-Be.-3; L.. 1969, ch. 197, § 88. The 1969 amendment substituted "divi· 
sion of family aerviees" for "public wel-
fare commission.'' 
55-9-4. Revocation.-Licenses may be revoked for cause by or under 
the authority of the division of family services, in accordance with rules 
and regulations prescribed by the board of family services. 
Rlstory: L. 194.3, ch. 16, § 4.; 0. 1943, CompUer's Notes.. 
Burip., H-Sa-4; L. 1969, ch. 197, § 89. The 1969 amendment aub!Jtituted "divi· 
sion o! family services" !or "public wel-
fare commi.ssion" and "the board of family 
services" !or "a.aid commi.ssion!' 
55-9-5. Crimes and pena1ties.-Any day nursery, person, association, 
rorporation, institution, or agency violating the provisions of this act, shall 
Le guilty of a misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1943, ch. 16, § 6; C. 1943, 
Supp., 14-Ba-5. 
Effective Date. 
Section 6 o! Laws 1943, cb. 16 prol.·ided 
that the act ahoold take effect on np-
provaL Approved March 17, 1943. 
( 
U.L T l..Al(E CITY ORDINANCE 
No._ nof1"1 
fChlkl Can i:a<:1nNn) 
~2PENDIX EXHIBIT D 
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER: 2 OF TITLE 51 
OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
UTAH, 1965, RELATING TO ZONING DEFINITIONS BY 
RENUMBERING THE DEFINITION OF "DECIBEL .. TO 
~FF~~1~J 1 ici 16A.¢~~NEG lAEcc;IW~Js.51A~1J·LlJN~~~G 
THE DEFINITION OF HOME OCCUPATION IN SECTION 51-
1 J..l. ADDING SECTION Sl+l ... RELATING TO A SPECIAL 
EXCEPT JON PROVIDING FOR CHILDCARE IN RESIDEN-
T JAL DISTRICTS: AND AMENDING SECTIONS 11-13-1 
THROUGH 18-13-13. RELATING TO THE DEFINITIONS 
APPLICABLE TO CHILDREN'S DAY CARE CENTERS ANO 
RELATED USES AS APPLIED UNDER HEALTH ORDI-
NANCES 
V.HE REAS, II h ~ "e~lre of this Councll to reocoonlu the 
~ f0< t~ P<OvldlnQ of QU<&ltty d'illd care within our COITllTWJ-
nlty, .-ind 
orou";;'~;,~ El~r·e~fd~~!l~f:~.\~~ ~a;~/~11~ rn:t~I 
cl111 f11mt1r 11lrnos~e within thf' r~ldentlat nl!'lghborhoods 
... 11hovf d1srvptlnQ normal ~lghborhood cher.ac1erlstk:s If 
P<oper b.al11ncM. and s..!!1"9uards are r~ed; and 
WHEREAS, If JS the cSeslre of the Covroc:ll to acknowledge 
the' mlxe-d u~ Of exhflnQ community f...cllffh:s that desire to 
ProvlcSe. 11s &<:ce,s.orr u""s, la~r ~ale ctilld care°' Pdvc:A-
!ional facllllles ~re parking, Ir attic, play, etc. c..n be -slly 
~commodate-d wlthovf disturbing thf' resl6e-nllal cho111r6Cle-r of 
the f>l!'lghl::ort>e:od; 
THEREFORE, be If ord11lrle(I by the City Covnc:ll of S..lt 
Lake City, Utah: 
SECT JON l. Th"' 01.,pter 2 of Tiile S1 or~ S<!ev!s«I Ord~ 
nan<::e-i of Salt Lake City, Ulah, 1%5, "s arne~. relatlng to 
definitions. be, ar.d the s.a~ Is f'>eretiy am~ by RENUM-
BER ING ~Ion Sl<z.17.1 de'flnlng "De<lbel" and ADDING as 
St<HonsSl·2·17.l,S12-17.11, 51·2-17.12:. 51·2·17.13. Sl·2-17.t4,S1-
2·17.IS. 51·1·17.16 de'flnllloru for fype-s of day care facllllles; 
ar.d AMENDING SK11on 51·2·3': cSeflnlng .. HO<Tloe Occu~llon". 
s.,Jd a~n-O~nh V'!all re"d es follows: 
SK SI 1·16 Cover119e ..... 
S« Sl·2·17.L Day Cere. Pe-r-s.oru, euoclatloos, COl"PDt'e-
llons, lns!llullons or agencies providing Ol"I a r"9ular basl• 
care and J.upervhlOl"l, {1e-i;i11rdle-s.s of edvcallona! emphasis) to 
children u~r lour1~n Yelin ol ege, In lle-u of care and IU-
pervlslon 0<dlnarlly provlcli"d by P-5rents In their own hor'nes... 
~~:~ ~~ ";,1~~:',!;;h~roT1'11:'I1.e~di~~~1~"'~d~ng~~1~e~11( 
l•e~ Via!! be clenlfle<:I es defined below end Viall be M.JblK1 to 
I~ 3PPllc11ble P<"Ovlslons of Tlfle-s 51. 18 and 70 of ffle-Me ord~ 
nanc:es. and tlPPllcable slale Jaw. 
s.ec; Sl-2·17.11. Day care CC<"lfe-n (nurs.erln, Pl"rKhooll. 
etc.). Pers.ons. anoclatlons, Institutions or Mien<:le-s, which 
pi-ovl~ der care f0< thrtt 0< more children and/or Pdu<.etlon-
al opPOrtunllles f'or chlldref'I under e~ ""ve-n (7). for Periods 
~r:D1~~~~0?:~~,!~~£:=1~117:~ s:1tE~~ 
pres.chooli. 
S«. Sl·2·17.12. Day Care, hourlr ce-t1f9'f"'S. Arly day c..n 
center, provider, or other fecltlty where day C•re end/ore-du-
~!I~~ ~:',11~" 1~: rn~"~~~or~~~"tm°!u":r'!~~',W 
day care cenlel"l OPe-l"ale<:I In a provlMr's home may qu.allfy 
f'or cl11nlllcallon •s re-glslere<I home day care or re-gl1l&red 
home Pl'lt-SC~lS. 
S«:. 51·2·17.lJ. Dav Care/ Preschool. A pers.on., auocl .. 
lion. lnsllhrllOl"l or •~rKY which adve<"tl""" ltwll as a pr-. 
Khoo! and which provld<es care and e<nPhailzn e-ducaflontil 
OPPOrlunl!IH tor ctilldren vndot' as.e M~ (7). Nofwlthsla~ 
lno PC1vc11ll01"1al empt-IHI•, tr a child recelvn c..,.. for rnot'9 
lt\an tour 141 houf'l r>« <Miy, the fac)llty shall be re-vulaled n 
•day care cef'lter. Small Pf"es.chools (under 7 chlldren) oPer-1· 
PC[ In provldef''I home may quaJUv for clas.slflc..tlon u reGls-
tered hom-e preJ.Chool. 
Sec. 51-2-11.14. O.y c..,.., non-re-vlstered home. A~ 
which us.e-s hl•/het'" prlnclNI pl.c.e of ,--lde1ic9 to proylde day 
care tor no more than t-...o U I chlld1"9n. 
\ 
\ 
Se-o:: 512·1715 Day care, reglstere-d home. A person who 
, ..es his/he< P<lnclpal Place oi residence to provide day c.are 
1or smo!lll group?> In e.io:Ces!i of two chlldreri. The group size et 
"nv given time shell not e.io:Cttd six, lnchldlno the provider's 
,,,.,n children under age !ilx. The group shall not Include more 
lhdn two Infant?> !unde-r two years) Ot" addltlOf\81 school age 
childre-n unleu In compliance with state regulallOl'IS aPPlka-
hle lo group compoosltlon A regf?>lere<l honie day c.are may be 
ronducte-d as an hour center or day care center depencflng on 
Hhether any ctilld re<:elves day care fOt" period?> el(CH'dll'ISI 
!our (~J hours per day. 
Se<. 51·2·17.16 0.Sy care. re<",llstered home preschool A 
~rson who us.t'S tils/her Prln.clpal place of re?>ldence to oro-
v1de e<:!vcdli0f1al OPPOHunltJe?> to< pre-grammar school age 
children (under &ge 7J Jn smart grouPS The group site aT any 
q1ven time shall not exceed six. lnclud!rtg the provlder•s own 
ch1ld1en un<'er "'"~six. II any ctilld, other than the provl~;s, 
1emd1ns for a period In exces.s of lour (4) hours, the preschool 
sh,,tl "''~o be consldere-d as" do!ly care center and be subiect to 
"PPl•Cdble re-gula!Jons. 
Sec 51 21750Klbel. ... • 
Se<. 51 1-J.A Horne Occupation. "Home Occupa!IOl'I" shell 
mean any use conducted entlrely within a bulldlng and car-
r.ed on by persons residing In the dwelling unit. This aca!"UC>-
ry use IS clearl.,. Incidental and ~oodary to the Us.t' ol the 
dwell1n-g IOI" dwelling DVrPQses and does not chanQe the char-
.-icTer lherf.'Qf and In connectlOl'I with which there Is no dl!iPlay, 
r.o s!OCk in tr11de. And no emplov-s Said homes.hall be the 
pr1n<•Pal re-sldence of the occupants. The home occupation 
~h11ll no! Include the ~le of commodities. except those which 
Me produced on the preml5.t'5, ands.hall not Involve the Us.t' of 
.-iny atce-s.~y bvlldlng, yard or 11ctlvlty ouf510e of the main 
t ..... i1<11no 
In P11rtlcular a home occupation Include~;, bu1 l!i not llmlt-
;aeotn°." :;;~f~:~o~l-Zeer;~en~I~~.''; '=~ ~~~r;,:~\A~~ 
for consultatlon 0< emergency treatment. bu1 not for the g~ 
eu1I pracllce of hls profession; the occupation of a dress.mak-
er. milliner or seamstress who has no assistants; the occuP&-
llon of a musician who teache!i Yol~, piano Of" other Jndlvldual 
musical Instrument Hmlte<I to a slnole PVPll at a time; and 
r.on re<;;1lstered home day care as defined In Section 51-2·17.U. 
In .,11 cases where a home occu~tlon l!i being enga-ge<l In 
there sh111t be no 11dvertlslng of said occupation, no window 
d1~pl.-iy5 or slgns except as hereinafter permlMKI, an no em-
ploye-es employed other than pers.ons resldlnt;1 Al the resi-
dence 
Home occup.allon s.hall not be Interpreted to Include the 
following barber shops and beauty shops; commercial sta-
bles, kennels, real estate ottlce-s, other than an fndlvldual In 
his own home as outlined above; or the teaching of dance to 
more than one pupil at a time; band Instrument Instruction In 
grouP"S. and re-glstere<I home day care or registered home 
preschools. 
Sec Sl-2-lS. Lot.••• 
SECTION 2. That Chapter 6 of TJtle SI of the Revised Or-dl-
r,onces of San lake City, Utah, 1965, relating to provision?> for 
transltlonar zone-s. be and the same heret>y Is amended b.,. 
ADDING Section 51-6-U relafino to a speclal exception provid-
ing IOI" chi Id care In residential districts. 
Sec 51+1•. Si>eclal E)(ceotlon-Chlld care In reslderitlel 
dls!rlct!i ~re not otherwise authorized by this title. when In 
!he OPlnlon of the Board ol Adjustment the interest?> of the 
community wlll be 5.erve<I thereby, the Board of Adlustment 
may permit es 11 si>eclal exceotlon resldenflel districts to be 
u'>ed for P<Ovldlng child care PVr!iuant to the foltowlng provi-
sions and proce<lures: 
( l J Non-reglstere<I Home Day Care. NOl'l-regl?>tered home 
da.,. care, as defined In Chapter 2 of this tlfle, may be conduct-
ed In fhe home of the P<ovld&r of cara es• home occupation, 
sublect to the restrictions ?>et forth for home occupations speci-
fied In Section 51-2-J.A of this Tltle. No business revenue llcense 
or condlllonal use permit shall be required. 
(2J Re<"oll!itere<I home day care and home preschool feclll-
11es A pers.on deslrlnQ to revlster to operate 11 regl!if11tred 
home dAY c.are 0< regl!ilere<l home preKhool facllltv H de-
fined In Chapter 2 or this Tiiie In their hof,lfl In 11 reslclentlel 
district. as an accessory use. must obtain a conditional use 




from the Health Deoartme-nt. The P'e<mlnee Is also resPOt'l$1ble 
10 obtain llPPrOPrlate llce-nslng whffe aPOllcable from the 
Slate of Utah unde-r Sections .SS-9-1, et ~-· Utah Code Anno-
l<'lled, 19SJ 
(al Zonln<OJ cond111ooar use pe-rmlf. Appllcatlon. An appl~ 
c11t1on must be submlMed to the Zoning ~rtment for 11 slle'-
cl.rir non-transferable COt'ldlflona! use J>e'fmlf. ~fee fol'" s.akl 
permit v..,11 be ten dollars fSlO.OOJ. A3 a oart of the applk:6-
110f"I. the app!lcanl must wbmlt documet'llatlon demonstrating 
that 
(I J ~ appflcant resides at the home In 'Nhlcti tt1e 
buslneu will be cO!)dvded; 
12J Al no time shall the app!lcant provide home daY 
c,,,r~ or home preKhool se-rvlcM for 11 lilrOUP of chlldre-n ex-
cet"dlng the maximum specified by Sectloris 51-2-17.IS end 51-2-
17 16. The ages and number of all children being cared for or 
P<'lfllclp.a!lng shall be stafe-d tog.ether with the period of tlme 
e<Kh child Is or wlll be under the 11ppllu1nt's care each dav. 
(]) Descrlplloo of services to be ottered. 
(.iJ DKl11r11tlon as to whether b.!l!.e'd on period of care 
Plf'f dav. appllcanl desires to be cons!clef"ed a day care centef'" 
as OPPO'>f'd to hourly care cenhtr. 
(SJ TI-.e outdoor play area tor the homr day care or 
home pres.chool shall be 1oc11ted In the rear or side y11rds of 
the home fOI" the protection and safety of the ch!ldren and fw 
the protection of the neighborhood. If !.UCh yards are fenced. 
the fences must comply with zonln<;1 Ot"dln.ances. 
16) n-.e aPOllc11nt and oermltee of a homr day cant 
and/Of" nom.e preschool must agrtt to conduct the s.ervl~ In a 
manner of a home occuP11llon. to.wit The-re shall be no actver-
tls1"9 of s..ald occupation, ~ln.M.S or s.ervlce, no window or 
orner signs or 01sp111ys, no employees. no us.e of any accessory 
buildings. and no olay or yard e<iulPO"'IC"nl located In the front 
y11rd The us.e of the l"lome for the s.ervlces of providing chlld 
care shall be clearlv Incidental and 5.eeondarv to the use of rt'9 
dwelllrtQ tor ctwelllfl'OI PUrPOses and shall not change the c:har-
aclef" of the home or the neighborhood. 
Pl Aoollcant shall M1ree lo abl~ bY standards set by 
the He-alth DePl!rtment unde-r Chapter 13 of Tltle Ill where 
applicable 
(9) That the care and su~rvlslon of the chlldren be 
conducle<I In a manner wtilch Is not a pUbllc nuisance to the 
ne-1ghbOl""hocxt 
(9J Proof of approorlate llcenslng from the State of 
Ut11h where applicable. rx ~sls uPCM"I which exemption thef'&-
lrom ls clalmed 
(JO) N11mes and address.es of recOt"d prOPe<fy owners 
of land surroundlrtQ app!lc11nt's residence as refleded bv an 
owner~hJp Plat 11 Is Intended this shall lnclvde ownen of 
oroDertv sllualed within an 8.S·fool POrameter around the par-
cel contalnlrtQ applicant's residence. 
( 11 J Once granted, a permlttee mav re<iue-st annual 
renewal bY submitting an aPPllcallon with any updated Info!"· 
matlon and 11 renewal lee of Sl.00. A renewer mav be l!IP-
~~~~ ~~~~~s~:fl~T~ g:,t;~1'-:ndo%'"i°ih'e r~~:e ~/ :::, 
Pending complaints Hlalnsl the permlttee. Should anv corn-
olalnts be pendlnt;1 or unresolved, action of renewal shall be 
staved and deferre<I unlll resolution of the complalnt. 
(bl Hearlnt;1, wavier and permit Issuance. TI-.e inltlal 
aDtlllcallon (natl-renewals) for 11 sDeCJal ucet:1tlon condltlonal 
us.e Permit to operate a registered home day care or regl1-
lered home ore,.chool as an acc.es.sorv use In a r"ldentlal dis-
trict shall be sublecf to the review and approval ol the Board 
ot Adlustment to assure compllana with standards set torth 
above After the Zoning Director ~termlne-s an aPDlkatlon 
:C~~r~~,P~e~:~~"a~!'~11~1i:e~e aJ:11~1~ .sr~ ~ 
Its regularly s.c:heduled l'T\oMllnos. Notia of the meeting wlll be 
malled to the adjoining pr00&rtv owners listed on (a)(10) 
11bove at least one week prior to the meeting. HO'Wever, said 
hearing and review bv the Board mav be waived and condl-
~~~n~:':~a~s=l~~t'::i.z~~g~~~e°'"Df l~'f: ~~~:: 
Ing prooertv owners spe.clfylng they consent or have no oblec:-
llon to the prOPQWd accnsorv UM!. The cons.eont and slenature 
of one party appearlne of recwd will be held Mlfflclent to ulw 
3 
\ 
t(.HO~trvc_11ve notice !o all Pllr11tt holal1'"19 interests In the parcel 
ilnd lo constllute consent hx s.')ld parcel. Hearings or consents 
Me nol dPPllcable or rMulred for aPPlicaflons fol" renewals 
which may be granted on 11 staff review 11:1. described In 
1" J ( 11 J "bove Approval will be sublect lo obtaining 11 permit 
from the Health De-Partment befOf'e Zoning may 1:1.:1.ue a coodl-
r.oneil permit or rene-wal 
{CJ Post permit review and hearing lnu.much .n llP-
1.>ro;<'lt.s of Initial permits and renewals are b.!ls.e<I uc>on rep.re-
~en!<'lt1on:i. aore-elng to comply with :i,taf"ld.ards s.ef forth atxive, 
•sw<'lrw::e ol the Permit either 11dmlnlstr11tlvely, or after hear-
•n9 bv th(> 60.'lrd. will be subleoct to the continuing furlsdlct!on 
vf the 80.'lrd Review bv the Board of .Adlustment may be 
•-..::iue~ted bl' the petition of any <'l'dmlnlstratlve office< Of ad-
,,,,.,,"'9 oroperty own.er funder (11)(10) above) alle-glng !allure 
hr The dPPlicant ar.d/Of permlttee to comply wllti fhe stan-
r1Md~ ~er ~orth above Said petition :I.hall slate In P11rtlcul11rlv 
tf,e suPOOrllng fads <'Ind delall:i. lvs!llylng lhE' review for nori-
' ornplodnce Said review shall be condvc1e<l bv the Board of 
,;.,~,us!rnent. afler glvlr19 at least s.eve-n dal"s wrltte-n nollce of 
Th~ ht:>M<ng lo the permlHee. surrounding property owners and 
· a,_h pe!lhoner UPOn review. the Board may enter an orOer 
"~ ii d(-t>'TI5 aoproprla!e. dl~ouallfyln.g tht' ellglbllltv of the 
_,.,,rn,tte-e for renewals or relssuance o1 permit:!,, orderll'\9 
(u,--.,p11dnce. re .. okl"""1 or suspending the condltlonal us.e per-
rn,1 and or ;iny other ne<e-s5.11ry adrnln1slr11tlve or le-gal ac-
,,~ 
Id! Deiv care cenle-rs. nurseries and Pf"eKhool All child 
dilv c.ire centers (irocludlng hourly care centers). preschools 
o;- other 51mrl11r child care facHltles, olhe-r than re<;1lstered 
,,,_me dav care and re<;ilstered home presctiools, oroviding 
(ht Id deiy care shall be considered a buslne-ss re-Qulrlr>g 11 busi-
ness re>renue llcens.e l:i.:i.ued only after the prior approval of 
t~ Zoning DePdrlment and a re-gulalOf'Y license from the 
Health ~oartment 
(1) Special exce-ptlon In "R-1" through "R·SA" dls-
Troc!s Wtiere l'Kll oflierwl:i.e allowed Jn residential dlstrlc1s, a 
choidren·s day care facltltv, lncludln.g centers. hourlv cenfen 
and preschools (other tlian re-glstere<l home day care or pre-
school) mav aoPlv to the Board of Adiustment for 11 :i.De<lal 
e•cepl!on to conduct Ifs buslne-ss In 11 Residential "R-1" 
through "R-S.A .. Dlstrlc1 provided: 
( 11) Said business Is conducted as an acce:i.s.ory us.e 
wdhin 11 church bullding(5). community centt'I", PVbllc IK 
~E-m• oubl!C bulldlr.os. or PUbllc or private school fnslilullons 
Prl'- •dong full curriculum to chlldren of grammar school a~ 
or older 
!bl The permiHee has obtained aPPl"oval from the 
'S1.iTe ol U!ati. to operate the ProPQSed faclllty In comll(lance 
... ,in sl<'llE' r"'oulatlons. and Is otherwise In good slandln-r;i with 
su11e or is e•empt from svch re-gulat!ons. 
fc/ The maximum number of children which can be 
e<Ht'-d lor at a gl>rer1 time in the f&ellltv fas determined bv the 
health deoartrnent on the ca~cJty of the facllltv or otherwise 
sP-eCll•ed by ttie Stale) Is sJ">ecHled a'ld mav not be exceeded 
(d) That the bulldl119 site must provide adi!"Quate 
~pace for oll·slreet oaril.lng of parents and staH arid s.afe off-
s1rt:el areas for dropping and picking uP children 
(eJ That the manner of operation or the care or super-
~·s1on of the children and relaled ac1lvlfles does not constltvte 
"PVbllc nuisance In the neighborhood 
CO The Soard of .Adlvslmenf rnav lmPOs.e such rea:i.on-
.-!ble cor"\dlllons related to the ope-ration of the proPOs.ed centers 
including maximum numbe-rs of children to ensure the P\JrPOS-
es of this ordinance are !)reserved. 
SECTIONS J Thal Sections 18-13-1through181-JJ-IJ of the 
Pe..,ised Ordinances of Salt Lake City. Ut11h 1965. relating to 
the "chllClren·:i. care centef"s'', be, and the same herebv are, 
AMENDED to re11d II:!. follows 
Sec 18-IJ-I Detlnltlon:i. For the PUrPOSe of fhl:i. chapter 
The following Dhras.e:i., terms and words :I.hall have the mean-
>ng~ herein given 
(I J Dav Care Center. Children's dav care center :I.hall 
mean anv nur5oerv, person. association, corpar11tron, Institu-
tion. or aoencv which l)rovldes care and supervision tor three 
or more children under 18 vears of a~ In Jle-u of care and 
supervision ordinarily provided by parents In their own homes 




w11hov1 charge Revls1ered home day care and rl!9htered 
hon-.e- preschools, (defined In Sections SJ-2-17.IS and 17.16), 
may also be lrocluded II chlldren are carl!'d for more than tour 
(4! hovrs per dav. Hourly dav care centers are e .. cluded. 
C2) Hovrty Dav Care Center. Hourly day care center 
\hall Include any dav care cent~. re-glsfered home dav care 
or re-<;11stered home pres.chool (as defll"H!'d in Sections 51-2-1715 
and Sl-1-17 161 0< oiHlY nursery, peorson, auoclatlon, corPOia-
r1on lns!llutlon or aQencv wtilch provides care and StJpe.n.;l-
s1on for three or more chlldrt'n undef" 18 ve-ars or age In Heu of 
care llnd supef'"Ylslon ordinarily provided bv Parents In their 
cwn homes for P<e"rlods of leu than! fovr (A) hours In any one 
dav with or without charve. 
()J Pres.chool. Preschool s.hall Include any reglsf~ed 
home pre5.ehool and/or. anv person. as5-0elallon, corPOratlon, 
•nsltlull_oo or agency which 11dvertl~ Its.elf to be a Ol'"~f 
and wh1cn provides cart' and e<lu<allOl"lal l.&elllllH for children 
under ~ven (7) ve11rs of a~ with or wlthovf char~ fot' Je-u 
rn11n four (4J nours per day 
(4J ExempllOl"I. ••• 
Se< 18-13·2 Re-gulatory Permit Required. II stiall be un-
1awlul lor any Doers.on lo conduct, operate, carry on ot' rnaln-
lilon a f.oic1llly provldlfl9 day care as defined In SectlOl"I 51-2-
17 L et ~ wit~! having a license Issued by the Slate of 
Ut<}tl, II <}ppllcable. MKf a re-<;1ulatorv permit from the Health 
()eparlment 11 stl.iJll be unla...-ful lor ~li'lY person to OP!'f"ate or 
cMrv on an novrly day care center or preschool wlftiovt first 
obTaln1n9 a permit from !he ~If Lake City-County Health 
Department to 00 s.o 
5e< 18·13-2.l Buslne-;s License re<Julre<I It stiall be' un-
lawful lor any person lo condvct, OPera!e, carry°" or maln-
t.oin a children's day care center, hourly day care center, or 
Pre$.ChOOI. exclud1n<;r re-<;1lslert"d ho<ne day care or home pre-
school. as herein d€.'llned, without &ddltlonally oblalnlnQ a 
bu~lness l1cens.e from rne Salt Lake City Ucens.e OE-Partment. 
Sec 18-13-J App!lcallon tot" llcen'lot' or Pe<mlt Every per-
son desirln<;r lo obtain an tlourJy day care center, pres.chool or 
day care cenler llcens.e excludln<;r registered hot'ne day care 
llnd rt"Qlstered home preschool shall make an appllcallon to 
!he license department o1 ~II Lake City Every per50tl deslr-
1n9 !o Obtain a condltlonal use permit for re-<;1lstere<1 home dav 
care or re--glsfered home pres.chool snail m11ke 11ppllcatlon for 
o.erm+ts lo the Health and Zon!119 L)ep11rtments of S11rt Lake 
CltY Said aPPllcatlons snau Include such Information and 
d<}ta under oath respecting the classlflcallori llrw::l us.e tor which 
th.e license or permit Is re<Jvested as the License. ZOl"llng ot' 
the Health DeP11rtments may pres.cribe, lncludl119 11 clescrlp. 
lion of the child care laclHty and services and a slalt'frl(>nt of 
The personnel programs that are lo be used therefor. 
Sec 18·13-4 F~ The Health [)e.p.artrnenl permit fee tot" a 
reg1stere-ct home day care or a reglstere<I home i:>reschool (de-
fined In Se<tlons 51·2-17.lS and Sl-2-1716). snatl be one dollar 
!Sl OOJ per annum or any part thereof. A regulatory lkeos.e 
permit le-e for all other chlrd care f11cllltles, lncludil"l9 hourly 
day care center. pres.chool or dav care centers other than 
re91s!ered home day c11re or r1"9fstered hot'ne pres.chools, sh11ll 
be S15 00 
5e< 18·13-S Referral to Heatth clep.artment UPOn r~rpt 
of an ai:>pllcallori for a permit for a registered home day care 
or a reolstert"d preschool, or uPOn the recelot of an aPOllcatlon 
for a llcense permit !or a facility Provldlfl9 cnlld care or ore-
schOOI services. wld 11ppllcatlons for permits and/or llcens.e-s 
shall be referred by Zonl119 or Llcensl119 Departments to the 
Hell Ith Deoartrnent 
Sec 18-l~ Issuance of permit uPOn lnspecflori of oremls.-
e5 UPOn recelpl o1 an appllcatlon for a permit or llcens.e, the 
director of the Health Dfopartmenl or his authorized reores.en-
!at1ve, m11y m11ke an Inspection of the premises to be uWd as 
a child care laclllty II the premises are found to be In comoll-
ance wlth the city ordinances and rules and regulations of the 
he11lth dep11rtment, a permit shall be Issued bv the Health 
()epartmenl approving the us.e of such faclllty, sublect to z:on-
ln<;r approval The Board of Health shalt cause a cociv o1 such 
permll to be flte<I with the llcens.e or zoning department. No 
llcens.e or coodlllOl"lal use permit shall be Issued without a 
COPY of the regulatory oe-rmlt ot' the written approval of the 
5 
\ 
'"ie<"Jllh Oi"p<"Jrtmenl. Anv llcense lssuff:I wlthovt approval from 
Zoning and Health Oe1:J.artmenn Is voidable In the event the 
premises uPOf'"\ such Inspection are lovn<f not In satlsl&ctory 
compliance with the ordln.ance-s and the rule-s !Ind rr-Qul11tlons 
ot the Health ()(>Pllr1ment, no such permit shall be Issue<! and 
r>(J llu•n5.e or condlflon11I use permll shall be Issued. 
SK 18-ll-7 Duration of license The licenses and permits 
P<O"•dM for In this chapter sh11ll run from the odgln.al d11te of 
;,ppro"111 to December Jl of the veer In wtilch It Is epprove<I 
All rern.'WillS shell run tore 12-tn0f11h Deflod starting JitnlUll'Y 
1 ;,n.d en.ding Oe-cemt.er 31 of e&eh veer, unle-ss SO<:>Oe-r re--
'°""' Se< ltl-13-S Suspension end re"ocatlon of permit and 11-
cense The permit Issued ur.de< lhls chapter mav be svso.erw:l-
ed or re"oke<! bv the dlrec1or of the Health departmefll uPOn 
the vlolallon by the hol(1er of any of the terms of this ordl-
n11n.ce, wtierevPOf\ the permit Issued shalt eulomatkally be 
susPt'ri.ded or revoked EKO!ilt as hereln.alle< pro.,.lde<:I, the 
su'>Pt'nsion ()f' re.,.oc ... tlon ol said permit shall lake- etteoct thirty 
d ... n 11f!er wrltle-n notice br lhe dlre-ctor crl the He.&lth [)e.part-
ment lo the permlHe-e advlsl"9 the l11tter of the contemor11ted 
suspension or re"oc ... llon and set11'19 forth the rea'-OIU fQt" MJCh 
... ct Ion 
Se<: 18-13-9 Id Htt1rlr19 Al anv llme bt'lore the ws.ooen-
slon or revoc .... tlon date. permlt1tt m11v rt'Qvest a l"we-arln.g on 
~Id proPOsed su'!>Pt'nslon or revocation beiore the Board of 
He<"Jllh which bo.!lrd sh<'lll pass finally UPOfl the matter of such 
!~~n~~~~r~ec:-~~~~,~~ ... ~ ~1:na!o~0r~r~t~~tt~~:!~ 
Ing Action bv the Board shall be referred to Zoning and U-
censl~ ()(>partmenh. 
Se<:. l&-lJ-10 Id Emergency_ He.arlng waived. \Nhen In the 
opinion of The dlrect0t of the Health Department there e•lsh 
<'In emergency v.tilch ~Y end<'lnQef thoe 1>Ubllc healtti or s.iife--
tv, the dlrKlor of the He<'lllh ()(>partmenl Is emPOWered to 
declare an emeroency and Immediately sus.pend any Olf all 
such oermlh lls mav be rt'Qulred, without a hearlr19 or prior 
no Ila! 
Se<: 18-13-11. Qper<'Jllon without permit dallv ottense. The 
OD(-ratlon ot anr child care facility without having In full force 
.-ind efte<:t re<iulrM permits and lkense from the Cltv to OPer· 
ate sn ... 11 be In violation crl this chapter <'Ind ellch day of OPl!'f'll-
llon w!!tioul '!>UCh permit being In full force <'Ind eHecl shall be 
constrved <'IS" separ<'lle violation <'Ind 1>Unlshable <'IS such. 
Se<: 18-13-12 Plan approval rt'Qulred for t"le'W or <'lllered 
faclll!les ••• 
Se<: 18-13-13. Inspection bv Sall Lake Cltv-County Health 
Oe-oartment tt shall be the duly crl the director of the Health 
()('partmenl or his authorized represenlall¥e, lo visit and ln-
'!>pecl all hourlv care centers. preschools, and dav care centers 
for the PVrpase of de!ermlnl"9 the s1.1nltarv conditions therein 
<'Ind 10 determine ~the< the same are being conducted Jn 
compllence with this ordinance and the rules and rr-Qulatlons 
of the Sa!! Lake Cltv-Coonly Health De-Partmenf. 
Se<: 18 ll·H. Postlr19 and llllng of results. •u 
SECTION "· This ordinance shall f<'lke effecl uPOn Its first 
PVbl~ca"s'~ bv the City Cooncll dt Sall Lake City, Utah. this 
:19tti d<'lv of October, 1981 
ATTEST 
1s1 Kathrvn Marshall 
CITY RECORDER 
/sf Palmer DePaulls 
CHAIRMAN 
Tran'!>mlNM lo Mavor on October JO, 1981 
"N.~or·s Action 
ATTEST 
;51 Kethrvn "N.rsh11ll 
CITY RECORDER 
(SEAL) 
BILL 7Sof 1981 
Pubtlshe<I Nov 1, 1981 
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-APPENDLX EXHIBI.T E 
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harinf"l lo th1 rn'ch·es or others. This home must comply with guidelines set 
forth ii. sl'·tiun 51-6-12 and the maximum number of persons being supervised 
in "n' grnllp home shall be limited to twelve persons, and may be Jess 
d· p0nding upon the maximum set for various use c:listricts. s.TI No JO, 1981 
, 0 , 51-2-33.1. Hard •urlaced. "Hard surfaced" shall mean concrete or 
£'~phtilt ~urfoce. 
Sec. 51-2-33.2. Hi,toric buildings. "Historic building" shall mean any 
'.Juilding listed in the National JU,gister of Historic Places or on the Utah State 
Rq;isler of Historic Sites. 
~cc. 51-2-34. Home occupation. "Horne occupation" shall mean any use 
conducted entirely within a building and carried on by persons residing in the 
d" riling unit. This accessory use b clearly incidental and secondary to the use 
nf the d"dling for dwelling purposes and does not change the character 
tlwrc>eil nn<l in connection with which there is no display, no stock in trade, and 
tJ'l l'IT1ployL>f'S. Said home shall he the principal residence of the occupants. The 
home occupation shall not include the sale of commodities, except those which 
are produced on the premises. and shall not involve the use of any accessory 
bllilding, ylifd or activity outside of the main building. 
In particular a home occupation includes, but is not limited to, the 
following: The use of the home by a physician, surgeon, dentist, lawyer, 
engineer, or other professional puson for consultation or emergency 
lI1·Btrnent, but not for the general practice of his profession; the occupation of 
A dressmaker, milliner or seamstress who has no assistants; the occupation of 
u musician who teaches voice, piano or other individual musical instrument 
limited to a single pupil at a time; and nonregistered home day care as defined 
i!i_"':<:L_iQn_5_J-2-J 7 .14. In all cases where a home occupation is being engaged in 
there shall i;;:-;:;o advertising of said occupation, no window displays or signs 
except as hereinafter permitted, and no employees employed other than 
persons residing at the residence. 
Home occupation shall not be interpreted to include the following: barber 
shoµs and beauty shops; commercial stables; kennels; real estate offices, other 
th An an inclividual in his own home as outlined above; or the teaching of dance 
to more than one pupil at a time; band instrument instruction in groups; and 
iegi~te!:_ij_b_o_me <la~e of registered home preschools. a.nNo 1a.1oe1 
Ser 51-2-34.1-4. Reeerved. B•No.30.1081 
Sec. 51-2-34.5. lloapital. An institution providing qualified health, 
mPdical and surgical staff and related personnel services for the diagnosis, 
lrulf rrif'nl and recovery care of persons suffering from disease or injury, 
pr- 1rnarily on an inpatient basis. Short Lenn surgical centers or clinics 
V "' 11!<ng 24 hour care. shall be considered hospitals. A hospital may include 
<ntrgrnl ,,11pport service facilities such as laboratories, outpatient units, 
liaining unrl centeral services together with staff offices necessary to the 
upc:rot 1011 of thf• hospital. e.a No 30. 111181 
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